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Contracting By the Federal Government for Legal Services:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis
William V Luneburg*
In the private sector, traditionally, corporations have obtained
needed legal services not only by hiring attorneys to work full-time as
their employees but commonly by ccntracting with private lawyers or
firms to furnish advice or other assistance. The escalating cost of legal
services has caused reevaluation of this practice,1 though reliance on
outside counsel, particularly in the area of litigation, remains
substantial.
2
Contracting for legal services by the Federal Government has been,
and continues to be, the exception rather than the rule. Legal services
are generally provided by agency staff or the Department ofJustice (Jus-
tice). However, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) contract
out a sizeable amount of their legal work, a large portion of which is
litigation-related. Their expenditures for outside counsel have grown
geometrically since the early 1980's as more and more banking institu-
tions within their respective jurisdictions have experienced serious finan-
cial problems. In 1985 it was reported that these two government
entities together accounted for eighty percent of all fees paid by the fed-
eral government to outside counsel during 1983 and 1984.3 Moreover,
according to that article, eighteen federal agencies and departments (in-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
An earlier version of this article was prepared by the author as a report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States. The report appears in the 1987 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Vol. I at 279. At itsJune 1987 Plenary Session
the Conference adopted recommendations to federal agencies relating to the use of outside counsel.
See 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-3 (1988). This article, however, represents the views of the author. It has not
been adopted by the Conference on any of its committees. An earlier draft report dealing with
federal agency hiring of outside counsel was prepared for the Administrative Conference by the law
firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr, and Solis-Cohen. The article that follows draws, to some degree, on the
research and interviews conducted by that prior consultant, though the analysis and conclusions
contained herein differ substantially from the Wolf Block Report. The footnotes herein cross-refer-
ence the appropriate portions of that draft report when it is expressly relied upon.
Many federal officials took the time to discuss with me the issues raised in this article as well as
to review earlier drafts. Obviously the final product reflects my findings and judgments, not neces-
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1 See, e.g., Fischer, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 4 J. L. & COM. 45 (1984).
2 See generally The Role of Corporate Counsel in Litigation, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS
(1986) [hereinafter "ALI-ABA Materials"].
3 Nat'l Law. J., Feb. 4, 1985 at 1, col. 3.
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cluding the FDIC and FSLIC) paid a total of approximately fifty million
dollars in 1983 and 1984 for the services of private lawyers. 4 The statis-
tics thus collected indicated that the practice of legal service contracting
extended far beyond the banking agencies. 5
While reliance by private corporations on both in-house and outside
attorneys is hardly a matter of public concern and debate, the Federal
Government's similar practice has provoked both publicity and debate,
though the scope of the government's use of private counsel is, in most
instances, less on a relative scale than in the case of many private corpo-
rations. There appear to be at least three basic sources of these differing
reactions:
6
a. While elimination or encouragement of the government's reli-
ance on private attorneys will hardly balance the federal budget by itself,
the current concern over mounting federal deficits and the need for ef-
fective control translates into a perceived need to ensure that all govern-
ment operations are conducted on a cost-effective basis to the extent that
the law permits. Since government personnel costs attributable to full
time employee-attorneys may be substantially less (or more) than the
cost of obtaining private legal assistance, the "make or buy" decision
with regard to legal services is potentially a fruitful area for examination.
b. While "favoritism" in choosing a legal advisor may be bad busi-
ness for a corporation, it may present even greater problems in the pub-
lic sector. This has a variety of aspects, the most important being that
the government presumably does not operate for the benefit of private
entities or individuals who have an inside track on obtaining its largesse.
It is expected that government monies will be used largely for "public"
purposes not "private" advantage. The very legitimacy, and effective-
ness, of the government requires that both the fact and substantial ap-
pearance of "favoritism" be avoided in government contracting.
c. Finally, the place of the law and the lawyer in government must
be considered. It is impossible to divorce the ideas of government and
law, at least as traditionally conceived in this country. Law is what knits
the various parts of the governmental organism together and law is gen-
erally perceived to be the exclusive preserve of the lawyer. From this it
can be argued that, unless the government's lawyers owe exclusive fealty
to the government in their work (i.e. are its employees which it can con-
trol), the distinction between the public and private sector vanishes and
4 Id. The FDIC spent in excess of $30 million in 1983-4 and the FSLIC in excess of $8 million
during that period. Most of this was charged against the estates of the failed institutions, not appro-
priated funds.
5 Id.
6 In addition, the size of the corps of lawyers in the employ of the United States Government no
doubt prompts a questioning reaction when it is revealed that private sector lawyers are also relied
upon. Statistics indicate that in 1985, the government employed over 20,000 lawyers (not counting
the federal judiciary). See B. CURRAN, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1985 3 (1986) (3.1% of all 655,191 lawyers).
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with it the idea that the government exists to a large degree to control
private activity for a "greater good."
'7
Regardless of the difficulties of categorizing governmental action as
"executive," as opposed to "judicial" or "legislative" for various separa-
tion of powers issues,8 most would concede that the authority to sue in a
judicial proceeding to enforce federal law is an "executive power." 9 Tra-
ditionally the lawyer is the principal actor in the execution of this power
by his monopoly of access to the courts. As the Supreme Court indi-
cated, responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States to vindicate "public rights" must be vested in "Officers of
the United States" appointed by the President10 or, if Congress permissi-
bly so authorizes, by "the Courts of Law" or the "Heads of Depart-
ments." 11  Unless a private attorney retained to litigate for the
government is appointed as an "officer," the contract may involve an un-
constitutional delegation of power where an "Officer of.the United
States" does not possess or in fact does not exercise sufficient control
over the activities of the private attorney in his or her handling of the
litigation.'
2
Moreover, governmental policy-making itself is a function that must
ultimately be vested, if not in Congress, then in the President or an "Of-
ficer of the United States" appointed in the manner prescribed by Article
II of the Constitution.' 3 To the extent that the activities of a private at-
torney retained by the government can be considered to involve policy-
7 This is not to say, however, that the public/private sector boundaries in the United States are
clearly distinct. See generally Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289
(1982).
8 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). But see Morrison v. Olson, - U.S. -, 48 S. Ct. Bull. (CCH)
B4006, B4037 (June 29, 1988) (In discussing the classification of officers as "executive," "quasi-
legislative," "quasi-judicial," or other, the Court noted that while a classification of functions may be
relevant, "the real question is whether the removal of restrictions are of such a nature that they
impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty .....
9 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
10 Id. at 138-39, 140.
11 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
12 Cf Morrison v. Olson, - U.S. -, supra note 8 at B4006, B4042 ("[T]hese features of the
[Ethics in Government Act of 1978] give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independ-
ent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.")
"Officers of the United States" do not include all "employees" of the United States; "employees"
are "lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States." 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. As
noted later, the distinguishing characteristic of a federal "employee" for statutory, and presumably
constitutional purposes, is the degree of control exercised over his or her work. See infra and accom-
panying text notes 45-53. See generally Friedlander v. United States Postal Service, 64 ADMIN. L. 2d
(P & F) 1337 (D.D.C. 1987) (The court rejected a claim that the Postal Service is a business enter-
prise wholly independent of the executive branch of government and therefore functions unconstitu-
tionally. In part the court's reasoning focused on the degree of control exercised by the executive
officials, including the Attorney General, over the USPS and its activities, including litigation.).
13 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 126 ("any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' "); at 140-41 ("rulemaking ...
represents the performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law...
[and] may .. .be exercised only by persons who are 'Officers of the United States.' "). "Policy-
making" delegated by Congress to the President or his appointees is currently viewed as an "execu-
tive function." See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. at 3192 (1986); Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, supra note 8 at 954 n.16.
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making, the need for sufficient control by "officers" of the United States
is similarly present.
14
Finally, aside from any constitutional arguments, there are a variety
of pragmatic considerations which must be considered in connection
with the government's use of private counsel to perform both litigation
and non-litigation services and the degree of control required. 15
Adequate control presumptively exists when a full-fledged em-
ployer-employee relationship has been established. This is not to say,
however, that there are no circumstances where countervailing consider-
ations, including the need to conduct operations in a cost-effective man-
ner, may not justify some departures from the norm.
Traditionally, most federal agencies have relied on their own legal
staffs for non-litigation services. Congress has largely concentrated liti-
gation services for the government in the Department ofJustice.' 6 There
have been instances, however, where a federal entity has been given the
power by statute to litigate through its own employees' 7 or even through
outside counsel.18 Moreover, on occasion justice has entered into mem-
oranda of understanding with certain agencies permitting the latter to
represent their interests in court through their own attorneys.' 9
The article that follows examines the legal (including policy) issues
presented by agency use of outside counsel for litigation and non-litiga-
tion services. The basic questions are (1) whether and when such legal
services contracting is permitted as a matter of law; (2) what considera-
tions should govern the decision to seek outside assistance where the
necessary authority exists; and (3) what procedures must or should be
followed in the procurement of those services. The three concerns dis-
cussed above are central to the treatment of these matters.
The fundamental conclusion of this article is that the government
may justifiably contract out for legal services where it will be cost-effec-
tive to do so, but only in a such a manner as to avoid the fact or appear-
ance of favoritism and only where close control over attorney conduct is
14 See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 n.26 (D.D.C. 1986) (compo-
sition of Federal Open Market Committee to include other than governmental officials held to be
constitutional, in part because of the nature of the authority exercised and the degree of control
retained by governmental officials). See also Bruff, The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs,
1987 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Vol. I at
533, 550-56.
15 See infra note 42.
16 See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1982):
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an Executive department or military
department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the
United States, an agency, or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing
of evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department ofJustice ....
(emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518, 519, 547(2) (1982). See generally infra note 43 for
the reasons.
17 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 228a (1982) (Department of Agriculture); 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1982) (Federal
Trade Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 2061(e) (1982) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7605 (1982) (Environmental Protection Agency).
18 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (1982) (Department of State); 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(1)(E) (Small Busi-
ness Administration); 22 U.S.C. § 2504 (1982) (Peace Corps); 26 U.S.C. § 9010 (1982) (Federal
Election Commission).
19 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7605(b) (1982) (EPA).
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either clearly present or unnecessary in order to protect the constitu-
tional and other previously noted concerns.
20
Unfortunately, in practice this general proposition is easier to state
than apply. For example, it may be cheaper in monetary terms to use
inside counsel on a case. Because of the lack of expertise of agency attor-
neys, however, the likelihood of a satisfactory result may be less in some,
perhaps unknown degree than if outside counsel is used. Unless a stat-
ute mandates that a particular procedure be followed in procurement,
difficult choices may be presented in fashioning a procedure that both
mitigates the costs of delay and at the same time substantially dissipates
appearances of favoritism. Finally, the degree of control necessary in a
particular case cannot be decided in the abstract. Only close attention to
the particular facts and the surrounding context can result in a satisfac-
tory resolution of this problem.
As a point of departure, the first section to follow examines current
corporate practices with regard to retaining outside counsel. This offers
some insights into practices and procedures that may help ensure cost-
effective government use of the legal services of non-government attor-
neys. The next section discusses the law of procurement and civil service
as it applies to service contracting. The 1986 Debt Collection Amend-
ments,2 1 which authorize the Department of Justice to contract with pri-
vate attorneys to collect delinquent loans, are then discussed in detail for
the light they shed on the issues presented. A survey of current agency
practice focusing on the experience of the FDIC and FSLIC follows this.
After a short discussion of the applicability of federal conflict of interest
law, general conclusions and recommendations are set forth.
I. Corporate Practice in Retaining Outside Counsel:
A Point of Comparison
As noted at the outset, the federal government is not the only entity
that both employs a staff of attorneys on a full-time basis and also retains
outside counsel to provide it with legal services. This is common practice
for most corporations and other business entities, though in recent years
the escalation of the costs of legal services has been a potent factor forc-
ing reconsideration of traditional approaches in this area.2 2 Still, appar-
ently forty percent of the expenditures of corporate legal departments
are for outside counsel.23 Obviously there are significant distinctions be-
tween the federal agency and the private sector purchaser which must be
considered in drawing on the latter's experience and practices. In this
regard the most significant differences include the congressional policy
20 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
21 Pub. L. No. 99-578, - Stat. - (approved October 28, 1986).
22 But see ALI-ABA Materials, supra note 2, at 9 ("The results [of survey] tend to show that
despite the large amount of publicity which has been given to the growth of in-house litigation de-
partments, the bulk of corporate litigation is still handled in the traditional way, by outside coun-
sel"). The Charts reprinted in notes 29, 32 find 37 infra were prepared as part of the 1985 survey of
corporate law departments by Price Waterhouse. They are reprinted here with permission. All
rights reserved.
23 Id. at 23.
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of vesting the Department of Justice with most of the litigation authority
of the federal government, 24 along with the public interests at stake in
government litigation and other legal matters.
Nevertheless, examination of private sector practice may be a source
of good ideas that can defensibly be emulated by the various federal
agencies and other entities. In fact, as will be seen later,25 at least some
federal agencies do follow practices that find clear analogies in the cor-
porate area. There is no reason to believe that by continuing to study
each other's approaches to the problems of retaining outside counsel,
the practices of each cannot be improved.
2 6
As part of the research for this study, an informal survey was con-
ducted of corporations with regard to their practices in retaining outside
counsel. The subjects included businesses involved in manufacturing,
service and other areas. 27 In addition various published materials deal-
ing with corporate practices were reviewed.28 The survey and literature
disclosed a considerable lack of uniformity in the manner in which corpo-
rations deal with the matter of outside counsel as well as some practices
that, on their face, might be profitably adopted by federal agencies.
A. The Presence of Written Guidance
Some corporations have no internal documents that relate to the re-
tention and supervision of outside counsel. This may be due to the fact
that use of outside counsel is infrequent. Alternately, only one or a few
persons may generally be involved in the hiring decision and the follow-
up and it is not considered essential to write down what procedures must
be observed.
Where memorialization of the practices exists, it ranges from the
general to the very specific. Matters covered in the guidance documents
24 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 316-425 and accompanying text.
26 The American Corporate Counsel Association is a source of information for federal agencies
interested in learning more regarding corporate practice.
27 This survey included H.J. Heinz Co., PPG Industries, Inc., USX Corporation, Westinghouse
Electric Corp., Equimark Corp., USAir, Allegheny International, Mellon Bank Corp., Dravo Corp.,
Consolidated Natural Gas Co., Rockwell International, Koppers Co., Inc., and the Aluminum Com-
pany of America. Since some of the companies consider their approaches to retaining and supervis-
ing outside counsel "confidential," there is no specific attribution in this report for various
statements.
The questionnaire to these companies indicated the following areas of interest:
1. The type or types of legal services which are provided to the company through outside
counsel.
2. The reasons for seeking outside legal advice where the corporation already employs attor-
neys.
3. The process used to choose a firm or attorney (e.g., some type of competitive bidding ar-
rangement).
4. The criteria employed to choose a particular firm or attorney and whether these criteria or
the process of choice are described in any internal written document.
5. The type of supervision or control maintained and the means for doing this (e.g., weekly
status reports).
6. Conflict of interest or other ethical problems that have arisen and how the likelihood of
these problems can be reduced.
7. The range of fees for attorney, paralegal.and support services paid to outside counsel.
28 See ALI-ABA Materials, supra note 2.
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include the criteria for deciding when to contract-out for the services, the
considerations relevant to the choice of a particular attorney or firm to
handle" a problem, the nature of the supervision expected of inside coun-
sel over the outside attorney, and reporting and billing practices.
B. Reasons for Seeking Outside Counsel
There are a variety of stated reasons for seeking outside legal serv-
ices.29 For some corporations, litigation is always, or almost always, the
preserve of outside counsel. Often one of the principal motivating fac-
tors in the hiring decision is the limit on staff resources and time to do
necessary work. Somewhat related to this is the need for specialized ex-
pertise that cannot be found within the corporation's ranks. However,
where a particular type of legal problem is likely to recur, the argument
for hiring additional staff to deal with that situation may prevail depend-
ing on a variety of factors, including the cost of hiring outside counsel on
a regular basis to handle such cases. Where lack of in-house expertise is
cited as a reason, often the legal issues presented are governed by local
or state law or by certain aspects of federal law that are generally within
the domain of specialists.
In some instances corporations ask for the legal advice of outsiders
because of a particular need for "independence" in the rendering of the
opinion or as a check on an opinion rendered internally in an area where
the inside lawyer may have less experience than outside counsel and
some "comfort" might be obtained by confirmation of the inside view.
In other cases outside counsel, because of prior contacts with the deci-
sionmaker or otherwise, may have superior knowledge of the deci-
sionmaker's concerns; or outside counsel may simply be perceived by the
decisionmaker as someone who should be listened to closely. Similarly, a
local judge or jury may view with skepticism or hostility presentations by
attorneys, coming from outside the district. Or, finally, the cost for the
corporation of transportation to and lodging in the geographical location
of trial may be so great that the only cost-effective manner of proceeding
is to hire locally.
C. Procedures for Choosing Counsel
The survey disclosed few instances where a formal bidding proce-
dure for hiring outside counsel was adopted. 30 Apparently an underlying
assumption is that competitive procedures may not adequately permit ex-
amination of the quality of the service provider, though, as will be noted
below, procedures for competition can be designed to consider both cost
and other relevant factors. 3 '1 While formal competitive procedures might
be eschewed by corporations, however, firms often engage in informal
cost comparison.
A corporation may have a continuing relationship with a firm (or
firms) in a particular geographical area (or areas). This relationship may
29 See generally id at 30, 50-53.
30 Id at 31-32.
31 See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text. But see infra note 201.
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give the client confidence that the firm will provide good work at an eco-
nomical price and, therefore, little shopping around for alternatives may
be required as needs for legal services arise. These firms can also pro-
vide references to other lawyers where the firms cannot, for one reason
or another, provide needed assistance to the corporation.
Many companies surveyed maintained lists of firms which had been
used in the past as a starting point for the search for a lawyer. In one
case the corporation maintains a computerized list of firms presently em-
ployed or those used in the recent past along with a list of firms which
have not been relied upon for several years. This listing, periodically
updated, includes evaluations of the firms and their lawyers based on the
quality of work product, promptness, responsiveness and depth of re-
search, cost of handling matters, and results obtained on prior occasions.
That listing also includes the rates charged in past and pending cases and
the types of work performed by the firms listed.
Where written criteria exist for determining when to go outside and
whom to choose, there may be instructions to staff regarding the consid-
erations that should be taken into account to insure that the hire is cost-
effective.
D. Supervision and Control
The degree of supervision and control of the work of outside coun-
sel by corporate employees varies from little to a "team" approach
1988]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
whereby inside and outside counsel work hand in hand.32 In some in-
stances corporate legal departments routinely exercise close control. For
other corporations the extent of control is decided on a case by case ba-
sis. Even where corporate counsel is not part of the "team," he may have
to be copied on all pleadings, motions, and correspondence prepared, at
least where they are deemed "significant" by the outside attorney han-
dling the matter. There may be a requirement imposed generally or in
specific cases for prior approval of any pleadings, motions and other doc-
uments of importance. In some instances the corporation may reserve
the right to approve all discovery or it may in fact take over the pretrial
aspects of a case entirely.
At the time a matter is referred to outside counsel, a general plan for
handling the case may be jointly agreed upon by corporate counsel and
the attorney retained. A litigation budget of some detail may also be
agreed upon and periodically updated as a method of cost control.
33
Written status reports may be required, although some corporations
seem to think that this is not a cost-effective way to maintain control and
supervision. It may create billable attorney time which can be saved by a
phone call. Moreover, corporate counsel may be involved in approving
the particular associates and paralegals who work on the case or at least
may sign off on a general proposal for staffing. Outside counsel may be
instructed that the corporation will not pay for the time necessary to edu-
32 See ALI-ABA Materials, supra note 2, at 32.
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cate new members of the "team" regarding the case and the issues raised
where there are staffing changes during the case. Time for basic legal
research in an area necessary to educate firm lawyers may not be billable
to the client.3 4 Management programs, including proprietary, standard-
ized forms and associated software, are available to control litigation
costs.
35
In order to avoid misunderstandings regarding the expectations and
restrictions applicable to the outside counsel in handling legal work as-
signed, the corporation may distribute to outside attorneys a written de-
scription of the procedures that apply to the handling of the case. 36 For
this or other reasons, the decision to go outside, the choice of counsel,
and the supervision activities may be concentrated in the general coun-
sel's office of the corporation.
E. Fees
Naturally, fee arrangements vary with the type of work.3 7 Where
hourly rates are charged, they generally range from $80 up to $300 de-
pending on the nature of the problems presented, the geographical loca-
tion where the services are rendered, and the expertise and repute of the
lawyer or firm hired. Fees for paralegals generally range from $25 to
34 Id at 74.
35 Id at 93-123.
36 Id at 66-80 (for an example of a written description of the procedures which apply to a firm
when handling a case for CIBA-GEIGY Corp.).
37 Id at 31.
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$70. Flat fees and "sharing" arrangements are used on occasion. How-
ever, it is often not the hourly rate that is crucial in the decision to retain
outside counsel because, for example, the overall bill for an experienced,
but high-priced, attorney may be less than if the work is billed at a lower
rate by one who has had little exposure to the issues raised. Of course,
even if the cost is greater, the quality of work may justify the larger fee.
Discounts in normal fees are often negotiated and fee comparisons
between firms may be made before the choice of an attorney. Moreover,
once the relationship is established, the corporate client may require no-
tice and advance approval before a rate schedule for partners, associates
and paralegals is increased and the client is expected to pay the increased
fees. Some corporations specify the type of overhead charges for which
it will be responsible. 38 They may also indicate that where work is done
on their behalf that might be used for other clients (and for which those
clients may be billed) an appropriate discount of the fees charged to the
corporate client is expected. Furthermore, cost control may be achieved
by refusing to pay for case-familiarization of partners, associates and
paralegals who replace other such personnel in handling the matter.
F. Billing Practices
Requiring monthly invoices is not uncommon. This allows the cor-
porate client to keep a close watch on costs before they skyrocket out of
control. Information requested from outside counsel on invoices for
payment generally includes the names of the individuals performing the
services during the reporting period, their hourly billing rates, the dates
of work, description of the work done and time spent, miscellaneous
charges for which reimbursement is sought, and the aggregate amount of
the fees billed on the matter to date.
Clearly many corporations are increasingly taking steps to insure
that the use of outside counsel is cost-effective. 39 It is also the case that
where a corporation does a significant amount of litigation in-house, one
of the main reasons for this is the perceived need for more control.40
The control factor is an extremely important consideration with regard
to federal agencies' use of outside counsel.41
II. Government Use of Outside Counsel: In General
In obtaining legal services, whether or not of a purely advisory na-
ture, a number of inquires must be made by contracting agencies.4
2
Moreover, two bodies of law are potentially relevant: the law of civil ser-
38 Id. at 75.
39 Id. at 49-50.
40 Id. at 18 (cost is also a principal factor).
41 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
42 The agency must answer these questions:
1. Is there authority, statutory or otherwise, for the retention? While the agency's organic statute
may seem to permit it, detailed analysis of both the relevant statutes and the type of relationship
sought to be established is required. For instance, Where the attorney will litigate, even though the
agency may have statutory authority to enter into an "employment" relationship with outside law-
yers in some circumstances, the statutes vesting litigation responsibility in the Department ofJustice
may limit what appears to be a broad grant of authority.
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vice and public contract law. The former is largely in the domain of the
Office-of Personnel Management (OPM). The latter is regulated to a
great'degree by the General Services Administration and the Department
of Defense, as well as by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget. The relationship
between the agency and the person providing services may fall wholly
within the civil service regime, wholly within the realm of government
procurement law, or span both systems of regulation. Generally speak-
ing, when an employer/employee relationship has been established, civil
service law provides the applicable governing restrictions. When the ser-
vice provider is acting as an independent contractor, procurement princi-
ples alone control. In determining how to characterize the relationship,
the degree of government supervision and control over the work of the
service provider is of utmost importance.
Viewing matters in this manner, one of the principal issues raised by
agency retention of outside counsel relates to the question of control. In
view of the governmental, public and private stakes at issue where legal
services are rendered, should an agency use other than full-time employ-
ees which it can control and supervise on a continuing basis? Where the
agency wants to obtain merely an outsider's legal evaluation, the need
for close control over the performance of the attorney's work would ap-
pear generally unnecessary. However, where the attorney litigates on be-
half of the government, there are serious questions as to whether the
agency should (or can in some instances) surrender that degree of con-
trol necessary to permit characterization of the contractor as "independ-
ent" as that term is generally used in government personnel law. 43 The
2. Has there been a demonstration of need sufficient to justify seeking assistance from other than
agency staff? A strong showing of need may in fact impact on the resolution of the first issue, that is,
the authority to contract out the service (e.g. inherent authority).
3. What procedures and restrictions (such as compensation limits) apply to the hire? This requires
statutory analysis, examination of trans-agency and agency-specific rules in addition to examination
of the type of relationship created by the contract.
43 The Justice Department has noted:
The authority of the Attorney General over litigation is recognized by law, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 3106 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518, 519, and 547(2). This authority is supported by both
constitutional doctrine and eminently practical considerations....
[Ihe Supreme Court has held that "primary responsibility for conducting civil litiga-
tion in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights" may be vested only in
"Officers of the United States" who have been appointed in conformance with the provi-
sions of the Appointments Clause. Buckle), vb. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976). If the private
counsel who are hired to represent the United States are not appointed as officers of the
United States, it is questionable whether they may execute the law by engaging in negotia-
tion, compromise, settlement, and litigation on behalf of the Attorney General. In particu-
lar, we do not believe that individuals who are not officers of the government may commit
or dispose of the property of the United States as would be implicated in the power to
initiate or settle a claim.
The practical considerations include the risk of inconsistent positions being put for-
ward on legal issues, the possible resulting burden on the citizenry, and the waste resulting
from duplication of effort. The benefits of having the government's legal business concen-
trated in one well-trained and experienced corps of litigators, committed to government
service and subject to the supervision of the nation's chief legal officer, are obvious.
The broad use of private attorneys for litigation on behalf of the United States would,
almost inevitably, result in inconsistent litigating positions. Further, private law firms may
not be familiar with general litigating policies of the government or with the government's
interests in other areas of the law. The uncoordinated activities of private attorneys could
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degree of control requisite in furnishing legal services in matters falling
between these extremes is less clear cut: aside from constitutional con-
cerns, 44 the need to protect the governmental and public interests at
stake would seem, as a policy matter, to create at least a presumption in
favor of substantial supervision and control. Agencies may not be able to
both retain close control and escape the restrictions applicable to gov-
ernment employees filling legal service positions. Where supervision
and control of an outside attorney is sufficient to justify a classification of
the attorney as an "employee" of the government, the agency will have
to point to specific statutory authorization for the hire and, in addition,
may be subject to certain aspects of government personnel law.
Moreover, other considerations may influence an agency's structur-
ing of its relationship with the legal service provider. On the one hand,
limitations on compensation and conflicts of interest which attach to em-
ployment, but not independent contractor, status may inhibit obtaining
the service provider that the agency wants to retain. On the other hand,
competitive procedures attach to the procurement of services and limit
agency discretion to a degree that may be undesirable. There may be no
ideal resolution of the tensions thereby created. Moreover, as noted pre-
viously, in some cases (perhaps rare ones) both systems of regulation
may attach to some degree.
The discussion that follows focuses first on the crucial distinction
between "personal" and "nonpersonal" services, essentially another way
to phrase the employee/independent contractor dichotomy. These dis-
tinctions largely determine whether a particular relationship is subject to
OPM or OFPP jurisdiction. Statutes authorizing the hiring of attorneys
as "employees" are examined in this part. Then attention turns to the
thus have a detrimental effect not only on the conduct of particular litigation but also on the
government's litigating efforts generally.
Lack of adequate supervision and control is also likely to result in increased govern-
mental exposure to suits seeking damages for the acts and omissions of such private coun-
sel. Attorneys without experience in representing the government, and without day-to-day
supervision by experienced government officials, would be unfamiliar with the special
problems of public practice and the special standards of conduct to which government at-
torneys are generally held. Conversely, for the Department to expend the substantial re-
sources necessary adequately to supervise private counsel ... would almost certainly make
the retention of private attorneys uneconomical and impractical.
All of these problems would be compounded if agencies other than the Department of
Justice were given authority to contract for private litigation services. The possibility of
inconsistent positions being taken in litigation would become a virtual certainty, with a pre-
dictably adverse impact on the government's general litigating program. Decentralization
could increase the risk of losing otherwise meritorious cases, and of adding to the govern-
ment's liability in terms of counterclaims and negligence actions. If it would be difficult for
the Department effectively to supervise and efforts of private counsel without the expendi-
ture of substantial attorney resources, it seems doubly unlikely that the Department or any
agency could do so with respect to attorneys hired by other agencies.
Letter of Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Attorney General, Department ofJustice to the Honorable Mar-
shallJ. Breger, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States (Nov. 10, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter "Burns Letter"].
It should be noted that the thrust of this letter is to support vesting litigation power in the
Department ofJustice. Congress has not always done so. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text. Where it has not, however, many of the same arguments invoked by the Department ofJustice
argue for close control by the agency vested with litigation authority.
44 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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standards for determining whether an agency should exercise its discre-
tion to obtain the services of non-governmental personnel where they
will serve as independent contractors or otherwise. Finally, the procure-
ment procedures mandated by statute.and regulation that apply to per-
sonal and nonpersonal service contracts, particularly those relevant to
the area of attorney services, are outlined in general terms.
A. The Personal/Non-Personal Distinction
In determining whether a person should be considered an "em-
ployee,"'45 the Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel
Management) adopted the so-called "Pellerzi Standards" and the
"Mondello Supplement." 46 When the relationship between the govern-
ment and the service provider becomes that of employer/employee, a
contract for such services is denominated "personal."
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) succinctly explains the
situation as follows:
[A] personal service contract is characterized by the employer-em-
ployee relationship it creates between the Government and the con-
tractor's personnel. The Government is normally required to obtain
its employees by direct hire under competitive appointment or other
procedures required by the civil service laws. Obtaining personal serv-
ices by contract, rather than by direct hire, circumvents those laws un-
less Congress has specifically authorized acquisition of the services by
contract.47
Differentiating between "personal" and "non-personal" services in con-
crete settings poses significant difficulties for procurement officials.48 An
employee/employer relationship may occur either as a result of the con-
tract's terms or the manner of its administration during performance. 49
The key question in each case is whether the contractor's personnel are
subject to the "relatively continuous supervision and control of a Gov-
ernment officer or employee." 50 Each contractual arrangement must be
assessed in light of its own circumstances. 51
The FAR lists various elements which are considered in determining
whether an employer/employee relationship has been established. 52 Of
45 An "employee" within the meaning of the civil service laws is a person:
(1) appointed or employed in the civil service by a Federal officer or employee performing in an
official capacity;
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act;
and
(3) supervised and directed by a Federal official or employee. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1982). See
also FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, Ch. 304 at 304-3.
46 See generally Lodge 1858, Am. Fed. of Gov't Emp. v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 499-500 (D.C. Cir.
1978). For a restatement of these standards, see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
47 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(a) (1986).
48 See generally Lovitky, The Problems of Government Contracting for Consulting Services, 14 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 332, 341 (1984); Byers, Recognizing Personal Services Contracts, D.A. Pam. 27-50-121.
49 48 C.F.R. §§ 37.101, 37.104(c)(1) (1986).
50 Id § 37.104(c)(1) (1986). See also Lodge 1858, Am. Fed. of Gov't Emp. v. Webb, supra note 46
at 504.
51 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(c)(2) (1986).
52 Id. § 37.104(d). See also Lovitky, supra note 48, at 341-2.
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the six listed, at least three seem to be particularly relevant in the area of
attorney services:
(3) Services are applied directly to the integral effort of agencies or
an organizational subpart in furtherance of assigned function or
mission.
(4) Comparable services, meeting comparable needs, are performed
in the same or similar agencies using civil service personnel ....
(6) The inherent nature of the service, or the manner in which it is
provided reasonably requires directly or indirectly, Government direc-
tion or supervision of contractor employees in order to-
(i) Adequately protect the Government's interest;
(ii) Retain control of the function involved; or
(iii) Retain full personal responsibility for the function supported
in a duly authorized Federal officer or employee.
53
With regard to the services of attorneys in the conduct of litigation,
element (6) would appear to be particularly implicated, though no one
factor may be dispositive in finding that services are personal.5 4 For ex-
ample, as will be noted below, the 1986 Debt Collection Amendments
authorize the retention of private attorneys to collect non-tax indebted-
ness owed to the federal government.5 5 The legislative history and the
executive interpretation of the law56 emphasize the need for substantial
control over the efforts of these contractors.
As Professor Rotunda has observed,57 while an attorney possesses a
certain degree of autonomy in performing services for a client, there is a
considerable area subject to client control. The more sophisticated the
client the more likely control will (and perhaps should) be exercised.
The federal government is obviously such a sophisticated "client."
Where an attorney gives more than his legal opinion and, in addition, his
actions based on his judgment have a direct impact on members of the
general public, as a matter of good administrative policy (and also in rec-
ognition of constitutional concerns) close supervision and control by the
agency would appear to be called for in many instances. This would
seem to be particularly true in the area of litigation, where historically
the government and public interests at stake have counselled in favor of a
concentration of authority in the Department of Justice.
58
At the same time, several opinions by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) discuss consulting contracts for legal services and classify the ar-
53 Id. § 37.104(d)(3), (4), (6). The other elements mentioned are: (1) performance on site, (2)
tools and equipment furnished by the government, and (5) the need for the type of service can be
expected to last beyond one year. Id., § 37.104(d)(1), (2), (5).
54 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
56 See infra notes 245-66 and accompanying text. See also Burns Letter, supra note 43 ("More-
over, it is intended that there will be close, day-to-day supervision of such private counsel .... ).
57 See Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of Private Attorneys, 1 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS
85, 111-116 (1987).
58 See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518, 519, 547(2) (1982) and Burns Letter, supra
note 43. By their terms these statutes forbid an agency's litigating on its own regardless of whether
the person litigating is a full-time employee or otherwise. While statutory exceptions to the norm
are contemplated, the general thrust of these statutes concentrating litigation in DOJ, given their
policy, would seem to be to require clear statutory authorization for an agency's hire of outside
counsel for litigation. (This mirrors the approach to personal services contracting: specific statutory
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rangements as non-personal. A "consulting" contract is one calling for
services of an advisory nature.5 9 In one case the GAO found that govern-
ment supervision of the attorney's performance would not be required
due to the lawyer's extensive knowledge of the field. 60 In another, where
a legal opinion was solicited regarding the scope of the agency's author-
ity, the Comptroller General found that:
[T]he [agency] requested an end product-a legal review of its author-
ity and a determination of the extent of its independence from [the
parent agency]-and it was the responsibility of the law firm to deter-
mine how best to achieve the desired goal. This necessarily required
the law firm to perform its own research and to conduct an independ-
ent "unsupervised" legal analysis. 61
Viewing matters in that way suggests that many consulting contracts for
legal services would be deemed "non-personal." 62
Where an attorney is employed in more than a purely "advisory"
capacity, as where he or she drafts contracts, negotiates real estate trans-
actions or otherwise acts on behalf of the government in dealing with
third persons, the major decisions must presumably be the agency's.
These instances may fall somewhere between contracts for litigation
authority is required. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. This, however, is primarily intended
to protect the integrity of government personnel regulation.)
As will be noted below, however, agencies differ in the degree to which they view close control
of private litigators necessary and, even within the same agency, differing degrees of control may be
exercised depending on the nature of the case. See infra notes 356-79, 403-07, 423-25 and accompa-
nying text.
59 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 37.201 (1986).
60 Personal Services-Private Contract v. Government Personnel-Former Employees, 53
Comp. Gen. 702 (1974).
61 In re: United States Advisory Comm'n on Public Diplomacy, 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 73 (1981).
See also Comptroller General's opinion in B-133381, (July 22, 1977) (unpublished). In this case,
the International Trade Commission was found by the Civil Service Commission to be in violation of
CSC's rules as a result of its organization. The ITC General Counsel initiated the CSC inspection.
The ITC thereafter voted to appeal the CSC report. It contracted with two private attorneys to
prepare a statement for submission to the CSC over the signature of the ITC chairman stating the
views of the ITC regarding the CSC report and to prepare a memorandum to the ITC explaining the
work done and items in the report which they found objectionable and those which they found not
subject to objection.
The Comptroller General found on the basis of the apparently limited information available
that:
1. the ITC had sufficiently demonstrated the need to contract for the services because its Of-
fice of General Counsel had initiated the investigation and therefore, the ITC needed an "independ-
ent" judgment;
2. 5 U.S.C. § 3109 along with the ITC appropriation act granted the relevant contracting au-
thority;
3. the services performed were not within the statutory jurisdiction of the Department ofJus-
tice; and'
4. the relationship established as a result of the contract was, as far as could be determined
from the information available, not that of employer/employee, but purely contractual.
While only the last cited finding of this Comptroller General opinion is relevant to the topic
discussed in the text, it highlights the general types of issues that must be confronted in dealing with
any procurement problem in the legal services area. See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the topic encompassed by finding (1); infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text for
a discussion of finding (2); infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of finding (3).
62 See Lovitky, supra note 48, at 344. But see GAO opinion in In re Navaho and Hopi Indian
Relocation Comm'n, B-I 14868.18 (Feb. 10, 1978) (unpublished) (if attorney serves as general coun-
sel, the supervision may create personal services contract).
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services and those for mere legal advice in terms of the appropriate
amount of supervision and control.
63
Because of the impact on the scheme of civil service regulation,
agencies must rely on "specific" statutory authorization in order to jus-
tify the award of a personal services contract, whether for legal services
or others. 64 This requirement for "specificity" may arguably be satisfied
in a variety of ways. For example, a statute may authorize an agency to
establish an employee/employer relationship by expressly empowering
the agency to enter into "personal service" contracts. Such is the case
with the Veterans' Administration, 65 although the statute does not refer
to the particular type of services, thus raising the question of whether it
encompasses legal services, or more specifically, the power to conduct
litigation.
66
Some statutes expressly empower the agencies to use private attor-
neys to conduct litigation, though they do not on their face classify the
services to be rendered as "personal." Where it is contemplated by Con-
gress that the attorneys retained under the authority of these provisions
will be subject to close agency supervision and control, such statutes may
also satisfy the requirement for "specific" statutory authorization neces-
sary to exempt the hire from all or part of the scheme of OPM regula-
tion. 67 Both the 1986 Debt Collection Amendments 68 and a Veterans'
Administration statute may fall into this category.
69
Moreover Congress has enacted a statute, 5 U.S.C. Section 3109,70
which permits the head of an agency to "procure by contract" the tempo-
63 As with litigation, though, different types of cases may call for different treatment in terms of
the degree of control exercised.
64 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(b) (1986). Needless to say, whether a statute is "specific" in the relevant
sense may often be a debatable issue. Presumably this rule mirrors the assumption that if Congress
wants to exempt a hire from otherwise applicable personnel regulation, it says so clearly.
65 38 U.S.C. § 231 (1982).
66 Regarding this latter inquiry, the statutes vesting litigation authority in the Department of
Justice "except where statutes otherwise provide" must be considered. See supra note 58.
67 Of course the extent to which the hire, if it creates an employee/employer relationship, is
subject to or partially exempt or fully exempt from the civil service regime is a question of statutory
construction. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 245-66 and accompanying text.
69 The Veterans' Administration statute provides in part:
[With the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United States], the Administrator may
acquire the services of attorneys, other than those who are employees of the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, to exercise [the right of the United States to bring suit in court to foreclose a
loan made or acquired by the Administrator and to recover possession of any property
acquired by the Administrator]. The activities of attorneys in bringing suit under this sec-
tion shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General and to such terms and
conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe.
38 U.S.C. § 1830(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). This statute and the 1986 Debt Collection
Act might be construed as grants of authority to enter into either personal or non-personal service
contracts, within the discretion of the agency.
70 5 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982) which provides in relevant part:
(b) When authorized by an appropriation or other statute, the head of an agency may
procure by contract the temporary (not in excess of 1 year) or intermittent services of ex-
perts or consultants or an organization thereof, including stenographic reporting services.
Services procured under this section are without regard to-
(1) the provisions of this title governing appointment in the competitive service;
(2) chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of this title [5 U.S.C. §§ 5101 et seq.,
5331 et seq. ]; and
[Vol. 63:399
LEGAL SERVICES CONTRACTING
rary (not in excess of one year) or intermittent personal services of ex-
perts and consultants or an organization thereof without regard to the
statutes governing appointment in the competitive civil service. This au-
thority is "triggered" only by some other statute, including an appropri-
ation. What happens in practice apparently is that this other statute
expressly refers to section 3109.71
The Comptroller General has interpreted section 3109 "procure by
contract" language to authorize appointment to the excepted civil ser-
vice.7 2 However, any appointments of consultants under section 3109
must be obtained in accordance with the procedural formalities applica-
ble to civil service appointments.73 The authority is limited to the serv-
ices of "consultants ' 7 4 and "experts," 75 but contemplates that the
persons or organizations retained can perform work of a type normally
provided by persons in the regular civil service.7 6 Agreements calling for
the performance of personal services by consultants may, therefore, be
obtained under the authority of section 3109 in conjunction with a spe-
cific appropriation act;77
The FAR itself expressly acknowledges that section 3109 qualifies as
a statutory authorization for personal service contracting.78 Therefore, it
would seem that where an attorney will function as an "expert"' or -"con-
sultant" within the meaning of section 3109 in furnishing legal services
to an agency, the classification of the contractual relationship as "per-
sonal" will not necessarily be fatal where there is the requisite appropria-
tion or other statutory authorization which triggers section 3109. This
assumes, of course, that the particular appropriation or other statute can
be construed to encompass services of a legal nature.
Where the legal services at issue are deemed "non-personal," the
agency can rely on "general contracting authority" to justify its procure-
(3) section 5 of title 41 [41 U.S.C. § 5], except in the case of stenographic reporting
services by an organization.
However, an agency subject to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of this title
[5 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115, 5331 et seq.] may pay a rate for services under this section in excess
of the daily equivalent of the highest rate payable under section 5332 of this title [5 U.S.C.
§ 5332] only when specifically authorized by an appropriation or other statute authorizing
the procurement of the services.
(c) Positions in the Senior Executive Service may not be filled under the authority of sub-
section (b) of this section.
71 An example is the Department of Defense 1983 Continuing Appropriations Act which pro-
vides in part:
During the current fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, respectively, if they should deem it advantageous to the national de-
fense, and if in their opinions the existing facilities of the Department of Defense are inade-
quate, are authorized to procure services in accordance with Section 3109 of title 5, United
States Code, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.
Pub. L. No. 97-377, sec. 703, 96 Stat. 1830, 1849.
72 Lovitky, supra note 48, at 333.
73 Id. at 334. See generally FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, Ch. 304, Employment of Individual Ex-
perts and Consultants.
74 Consultants function in a purely advisory capacity. Lovitky, supra note 48, at 336. See also 48
C.F.R. § 37.201 (1985).
75 "Experts" are used in a primarily operational capacity. Lovitky, supra note 48, at 336.
76 Id. at 333-34.
77 Id. at 334.
78 48 C.F.R. § 37.104(b) (1986).
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ment.79 In this regard it should be noted that section 3109 has also been
interpreted as a statutory grant of authority to secure services (including
legal services) by "contract or appointment" where the triggering appro-
priation is present. 80 However, the section is limited to the services of
experts and consultants.8'
Where contracting authority, whether general or specific, is present,
a finding that a contract is "non-personal" means that the firm or individ-
ual retained is deemed to be an "independent contractor.
'82
Finally, it is worth noting that a statutory grant of contracting au-
thority may not be required, at least in all instances, to justify the reten-
tion of attorneys, whether as consultants, experts or otherwise, where
they function as independent contractors. Although courts have recog-
nized the inherent power of the executive branch of government to enter
into procurement contracts,83 Congress could presumably limit this au-
thority to some degree if it did so clearly.8 4
B. Standard for Procurement
Where a contract is classified as calling for personal services, the
specific statutory authority required to justify the procurement must be
consulted initially to ascertain the standard (if any) to be applied in de-
termining when the agency can retain outside attorneys.8 5 Moreover,
where personal consulting services are involved, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation8 6 specifies that an agency may contract for personal consult-
ing services only "when essential to the agency's mission,"8 7 and such
services may not "unnecessarily duplicate any previously performed
work or services." 88
With respect to non-personal services, examination of any relevant
statutory authority for the contracting would similarly be called for. As
in the case of personal services, any agency-developed standards must be
consistent with the statutory authority.89 But even without statutory gui-
dance, the FAR mandates that the agency consider the "relative costs of
Government and contract performance ... where Government perform-
ance is practicable. ."90 "In no event may a contract be awarded for
79 Id. § 37.102(d).
80 See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 309 F.2d 399, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1962). See also 61 Comp. Gen. 69
(1981) and GAO opinion in Matter of Navaho and Hopi Indian Relocation Commission, B-
114868.18 (Feb. 10, 1978) (unpublished) (discussed at 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 75-76 (1981).).
81 See 5 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982).
82 See 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 72 (1981).
83 Lovitky, supra note 48, at 339. See, e.g., United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 127
(1831); United States v. Salon, 182 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1950); United States v. Maurice, 36 F.
Cas. 1211, 1216-17 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
84 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
85 See, e.g., supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86 48 C.F.R. pts. 1-51 (1985). See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
87 48 C.F.R. § 37.204(b) (1986) (emphasis added).
88 Id. § 37.205(b)(1).
89 See, e.g., infra note 330 and accompanying text.
90 48 C.F.R. § 37.102(c) (1986). This seems to apply also to personal service contracting. See
generally id. § 37.102.
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the performance of an inherently governmental function."9 1 With re-
spect to non-personal consulting services, the FAR imposes the same ac-
quisition standards as it does in the case of personal consulting
contracts.
9 2
The General Accounting Office has indicated that, where Congress
has not provided otherwise, with regard to legal services of a non-per-
sonal nature, the agency must determine that contracting out is "more
feasible, more economical, or necessary to the accomplishment of the
agency's task."9 3 "Thus, where an agency has employees available,
whether attorneys or not, to perform a particular task, it should not con-
tract for performance of the same task. Each agency is responsible for
determining in each case, whether the particular services could be per-
formed by agency employees."
94
When consulting services are at issue, whether of a personal or non-
personal nature, the FAR permits contracts to obtain, for example,
"[s]pecialized opinions or professional or technical advice not available
91 Id. § 37.102(b). OMB Circular No. A-76 (Rev. Aug. 4, 1983) states in part:
b. Retain Governmental Functions In-House. Certain functions are inherently Governmental
in nature, being so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance only
by Federal employees. These functions are not in competition with the commercial sector.
Therefore, these functions shall be performed by Government employees.
e. A Governmentalfunction is-a function which is so intimately related to the public interest
as to mandate performance by Government employees. These functions include those ac-
tivities which require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or
the use of value judgment in making decisions for the Government. Services or products in
support of Governmental functions, such as those listed in Attachment A, are commercial
activities and are normally subject to this Circular. Governmental functions normally fall
into two categories:
(1) The act of governing; i.e., the discretionary exercise of Government authority. Exam-
ples include criminal investigations, prosecutions and other judicial functions; manage-
ment of Government programs requiring value judgments, as in direction of the national
defense; management and direction of the Armed Services, activities performed exclu-
sively by military personnel who are subject to deployment in a combat, combat support
or combat service support role; conduct of foreign relations; selection of program priori-
ties; direction of Federal employees; regulation of the use of space, oceans, navigable
rivers and other natural resources; direction of intelligence and counter-intelligence op-
erations; and regulation of industry and commerce, including food and drugs.
(2) Monetary transactions and entitlements, such as tax collection and revenue disburse-
ments; control of the treasury accounts and money supply; and the administration of
public trusts.
Arguably certain legal services, including litigation of some types, might fit this description in certain
circumstances, though Attachment A to the Circular does include a category, "legal/litigation
studies."
92 48 C.F.R. § 37.204(b) (1986). See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
93 See 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 72 (1981) (citing earlier opinion at 51 Comp. Gen. 561, 562 (1972))
(consulting services at issue here).
94 GAO opinion in B-133381 (July 22, 1977) (unpublished) quoted at 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 73
(1981). In one case the agency retained an attorney to provide legal assistance necessary to an
appeal because its General Counsel's Office had previously advocated the opposing position. The
Comptroller General determined that in these circumstances a sufficient showing of need had been
made. Id. The same result obtained in another case where an advisory commission used a law firm
to research the parameters of its legal authority after its parent agency had offered its own opinion
on the same subject. Specifically, that later opinion related to the extent of the contracting agency's
independence from the parent agency. An alleged conflict of-interest tainted the first opinion and
justified a request for another view. See 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 74 (1987). The Comptroller General
there reiterated his opinion, expressed on other occasions, that the pay limits found in 5 U.S.C.
§ 3109(b), see supra note 70, applied only to appointed consultants and not to consultants serving as
independent contractors. Id. at 77, citing 26 Comp. Gem 188 (1946).
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within the agency or from another agency," 95 and "[o]utside points of
view, to avoid too limited a judgment on critical issues .... "96 Agencies
may not, however, contract for consulting services where the contracts
involve the performance of "work of a policy-making, decision making,
or managerial nature that is the direct responsibility of agency offi-
cials," 97 that will "bypass or undermine personnel ceilings, pay limita-
tions, or competitive employment procedures,"9 8 "specifically aid in
influencing or enacting legislation," 99 or afford "preferential treatment
to former Government employees."' 00 While such activities are forbid-
den for "consulting contracts," it is not clear whether classification of a
contract as other than one for consulting services may avoid some of
these restrictions, 10 1 as for example, if the contract could be considered
one for "expert" services under 5 U.S.C. § 3109.102
Finally, note that even where there is apparent authority to enter
into a services contract, whether personal or non-personal and whether
for consulting or other services, and a sufficient showing of need for the
services can be made, there may be other statutes that have to be ex-
amined in order to determine whether Congress has in fact forbidden the
contracting-out attempted.'0 3 Examples of such statutes are the various
provisions in the United States Code' 0 4 which largely reserve the power
to litigate on behalf of the United States to the Department of Justice.
C. Procurement Procedures
1. The Personal/Non-Personal Distinction
Since personal services contracts must be based on "specific" statu-
tory authorization, 10 5 such authorizing legislation must initially be con-
sulted in order to determine what procedures and restrictions, if any,
Congress intended to accompany obtaining of the services.
Several examples are of particular interest here. The Federal Elec-
tion Commission (FEC) is authorized to "appoint" counsel to represent
it in certain types of litigation.10 6 Such appointments are "without re-
gard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appoint-
ments in the competitive service" and the compensation may be fixed
"without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of such title."' 1 7 The Comptroller General may apply to the
district courts to enforce its subpoenas "by counsel whom he may em-
ploy without regard to the provisions of Title 5 governing appointments
95 48 C.F.R. § 37.204(b)(1) (1986).
96 Id. § 37.204(b)(2).
97 Id. § 37.204(c)(1).
98 Id. § 37.204(c)(2).
99 Id. § 37.204(c)(3).
100 Id. § 37.204(c)(4).
101 Such as id. § 37.204(c)(1).
102 See supra note 70.
103 See, e.g., 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 73-74 (1981).
104 See 5 U.S.C. § 3106, 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518(b), 519, 547(2) (1982).
105 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
106 26 U.S.C. § 9010 (1982). See also id. § 9040; 2 U.S.C. § 437c(f)(4)(B) (1982).
107 26 U.S.C. § 9010(a) (1982).
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in the competitive service, and the provisions of chapter 51 and subchap-
ters III and VI of chapter 53 of such Title, relating to classification and
General Schedule pay rates."' 08 A final example is section 3109 of Title
5 which authorizes the appointment of legal consultants "without regard
to... the provisions of this title governing appointment in the competi-
tive service ... [and] chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of this
title" but subject to certain compensation limits.' 09
Where a statute uses the term "appointment," the position may
likely fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the OPM. Such is appar-
ently the case with regard to FEC counsel. The grant of authority to the
Comptroller General is similar. On the other hand, section 3109 of title
5 uses the phrase, "procure by contract" which on first glance suggests
that the experts and consultants retained are to be independent contrac-
tors. However the fact that by the terms of section 3109 such contracts
are exempt from both certain civil service provisions" 0 and from pro-
curement advertising requirements"1 has been relied upon to support
an interpretation of this statute as a grant of both appointment and pro-
curement authority, 1 2 the former subject to OPM and the latter to OFPP
jurisdiction. 13 With regard to the 1986 Debt Collection Amendments,
and perhaps the similar Veterans' Administration authority referred to
previously,' 14 it could be argued that while Congress intended that su-
pervision should be close, even to the point of creating what otherwise
could be considered a personal services contract, the contracts were to
be considered subject only to the procurement regime. 15 Alternatively
Congress may have assumed that the contracts would be subject to both
OPM and OFPP regulations to some degree. (Or Congress may never
have considered the potential for OPM jurisdiction.)
Outside of those instances where statutes indicate that the hire is
subject exclusively to civil service or other regulation, personal service
contracting would seem to be subject to the requirements of the Compe-
tition in Contracting Act (CICA) or to both that statute and some regula-
tion by the OPM. 116 The FAR expressly contemplates that the
competition requirements which it lays down, which to a great extent
mirror the CICA, apply to all services contracts, whether personal or
.108 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-24(b) (1982).
109 5 U.S.C. § 3109(b) (1982). See generally Lovitky, supra note 48, at 338.
110 5 U.S.C. §§ 3109(b)(1), (2) (1982).
111 Id. at § 3109 (b)(3).
112 See Lovitky, supra note 48, at 333-34.
113 Id at 334, 337-38.
114 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
115 Under these two statutes, if they authorize "personal service" contracts, it is a "nice" question
whose employees the attorneys would be: Justice's or the agency relying on the collection services.
See also 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(7) (1982) (SBA power to procure attorney services by contract for
loans); 39 U.S.C. § 409(d) (1982) (With prior consent of the Attorney General, the Postal Service
may employ attorneys by "contract or otherwise to conduct litigation .... ) (emphasis added) (This
may be a grant of both appointment and procurement authority.); 42 U.S.C. § 3211 (1982) (Secre-
tary of Commerce may procure attorney services by contract for loans).
116 The Office of Personnel Management has adopted a set of instructions applicable to the re-
tention of experts and consultants in positions excepted from the competitive service by statute or
by the OPM. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, ch. 304. These apply to appointments under, inter alia, 5
U.S.C. § 3109 (1982). They also apply to individual expert or consultant services procured by con-
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tract if an employer-employee rather than an independent contractor relationship is created. FED-
ERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, ch. 304.
An agency considering hiring an expert or consultant would obviously be concerned with the
restraints and conditions thus imposed. They may suggest that structuring the contractual relation-
ship with the service provider as that of an independent contractor is the preferable course to take.
It may, therefore, be helpful to summarize the significant parts of these instructions:
1. "Intermittent appointments can be renewed from year to year... temporary appointments can-
not," though there are exceptions. Id. 1-3(c).
2. "While persons appointed under... Section 3109 are excepted from the position classification
and General Schedule grade and pay laws, Section 3109 states that agencies otherwise subject to
those laws generally may pay up to the daily equivalent of the highest rate payable under the General
Schedule; . . . that rate is limited to the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule. The
Comptroller General has held that highest rate payable is the top step of grade GS-15." lI- 1-6(a).
3. "Because experts and consultants generally are paid on a daily rate basis, they are not entitled to
more than the daily rate prescribed in the appointment documents for each day of service regardless
of the number of hours worked." However, "an expert or consultant, employed on a daily basis may
be paid the rate of basic compensation for work on days outside the prescribed tour of duty, pro-
vided compensation within any biweekly pay period does not exceed the rate of basic pay for level V
of the Executive Schedule." Id 1-6(e).
4. Experts and consultants hired as employees are employees within the coverage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, though most experts and consultants are exempt from the minimum wage and over-
time pay provisions. Id. 1-6(0.
5. Unless the hiring agency otherwise provides, an expert or consultant is not entitled to a pay
increase on the basis of an increase in the General Schedule. Id. 1-6(g).
6. "Unless the appointment documents expressly provide for holiday pay, an expert or consultant
employed on a per diem basis is not entitled to compensation for holidays on which no work is
performed." Id. 1-6(h).
7. "Certain former members of the uniformed services are subject to reduction in retired pay if
employed in the Federal service." Id. 1-6(2)(i).
8. "An expert or consultant who serves intermittently may be allowed travel or transportation ex-
penses." Id. 1-6(k).
9. "An expert or consultant... who serves on an intermittent or other basis without a prearranged
regular tour of duty does not earn annual and sick leave [but one who is on] a regularly prescribed
tour of duty does earn such leave." Id. 1-7(a).
10. "An expert or consultant whose service is intermittent or temporary for one year or less is not
covered under the civil service retirement system and is ineligible for life insurance and health bene-
fits." Id. 1-7(b).
11. Statutory prohibitions on conflict of interest apply to many experts or consultants as "special
government employees." Id. 1-9. See also FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 735, Appendix C.
12. "Experts and consultants who serve as employees are subject to the same conditions and re-
strictions which apply to other Federal employees who are in the excepted service and who work on a
temporary or intermittent basis." ch. 304, 1-10(a).
13. "Each proposed appointment (and extension of appointment) must be reviewed and certified
by a high agency management official in terms of," inter alia, the need for the position, the correct-
ness of judgment that the position requires an expert or consultant, the qualifications of the pro-
posed appointee, and the appropriateness of the intended level of pay. Id Appendix A, A-1(a).
14. A suitable certification attesting that all the requirements listed in item 13 have been met must
be prepared and signed by the certifying official. Id. A-l(c).
15. "Agencies are required to maintain effective controls over use of appointees during employ-
ment." Such control includes frequent reviews, generally quarterly, to assure that in each case the
duties performed are still those of an expert or consultant, time limits are being observed, documen-
tation is kept current, and duties of record are actually being performed. Id. A-2(a).
16. Each quarterly review is to be documented and the record retained for OPM examination. Id.
A-2(c).
17. "For each expert or consultant employed, full-time or part-time or intermittently, whether em-
ployed by appointment or by contract,.., each agency must establish an Official Personnel Folder"
to contain designated documents, including a description of the position, a description of the ap-
pointee's background and qualifications, a Standard Form notification of personnel action showing
the employment, and a standard form showing termination of the employment, a certification that a
statement of employment and financial interests has been obtained and it had been determined that
no conflict of interest exists. Id. A-4(a).
18. The agency should obtain from each expert and consultant a statement of employment and
financial interests at the time of formal employment. Id A-4(b).
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non-personal, unless a statute otherwise requires.117 Moreover, the
CICA applies by its terms to contracting for "services" and makes no
express distinction between personal and non-personal services:" 8 In
fact, there is no reason inherent in the distinction between personal and
non-personal service contracts to require different treatment with regard
to competitive procedures.
Prior to the CICA, the GAO had clearly indicated that procurement
of non-personal services pursuant to section 3109 was subject to general
federal procurement regulations." 9 Nothing in the CICA expressly
changes that result.
2. Legal Services
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 applies to "serv-
ices,"1 20 without any distinction as to type, such as professional or non-
professional,1 21 attorney or accountant. In fact section 2753 of the
Act' 22 mandated a study and the development of recommendations re-
garding ways to "increase the opportunities to achieve full and open
competition on the basis of technical qualifications, quality, and other
factors in the procurement of professional, technical, and management
services."' 23 This provision suggests that the drafters of the Act in-
tended that it apply to professional services, which clearly include attor-
ney services.' 24  Moreover, given the concerns underlying the
19. Employing agencies must report their employment actions to OPM on designated forms. lI- A-
5.
Some expert and consultant contracts may be subject to regulation by both the OMP and OFPP. See
ia- ch. 304, 1-10. Attorneys providing other than expert or consultant services but still considered
"employees" may be subject in part to restrictions similar to those detailed above or others within
the jurisdiction of the OPM. It should be noted, however, that even full-time attorney positions are
exempt from important parts of the civil service regime, most importantly the competitive examina-
tion system and many of the tenure protection provisions.
117 48 C.F.R. § 37.105 (1986).
118 See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1) (1982). Technically, the 1984 CICA was an amendment to the Fed-
eral Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 271 1(a)(l), 98 Stat.
1175. The declaration of purpose of the latter statute indicated an intent to encompass only "non-
personal" services, see 40 U.S.C. § 471(a) (1982), which it defined as "contractual services, other
than personal and professional services." See id. § 472() (1982). See also id. § 481 (a)(1) (1982). This
gives rise to an argument that the CICA is limited to "non-personal" services and apparently some
officials so view it.
Other officials do not agree, as is evidenced by the FAR, and they would seem to stand on
higher ground on this issue. The CICA refers to "services" generally. It would be an odd bit of
drafting to define "non-personal services" at one point and intend that any time the term "services"
is used it is meant to refer to "non-personal services." Such drafting would directly undermine the
usefulness of a definitional section. In fact, prior to the CICA, the Federal Property and Administra-
tive Services Act contained an exemption from its advertising requirements for "personal or profes-
sional services," see 41 U.S.C. § 252(c)(4) (1982), which exemption was not continued in express
terms by the CICA.
119 See 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 78-9, (1981) (citing prior opinions). This opinion dealt with legal
services. See also Lovitky, supra note 48, at 338-39.
120 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1) (1982).
121 See also supra note 118.
122 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2753, 98 Stat. 1203.
123 Id. (emphasis added).
124 The Conference Committee noted:
The conference substitute requires the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to recom-
mend to Congress a plan for increasing the use of full and open competition in the procure-
ment of professional, technical and managerial services. This category of procurements
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legislation 125 there is no reason to think that Congress in 1984 intended
to exempt legal services from the purview of the CICA. Nothing in the
legislative history expressly supports such an exemption. In fact, in pass-
ing the Debt Collection Amendments of 1986, Congress expressed its
view that the CICA applied to attorneys services, at least in the litigation
context. 126  If it applies there, it is difficult to believe that Congress
would distinguish between litigation and non-litigation services with re-
gard to procurement procedures.
Finally, prior to the enactment of the CICA, the GAO clearly found
that at least in the context of non-personal attorney consulting contracts
entered into pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 3109, federal procurement re-
quirements applied.
127
Thus where there is a contract for services, the applicability of the
CICA is not affected by the fact that attorney services are being pro-
cured, at least where public funds are used to pay the bills. Where any
attorneys retained will be paid from non-appropriated funds, 28 it might
be argued that at least some of the concerns prompting the passage of
often involves the use of evaluation criteria, other than price, in the selection of the winning
vendor.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy is directed to recommend competitive selec-
tion procedures for procurements where price is not a significant factor and the agency has
determined a legitimate need for the best or highest quality proposal. Such a plan should
include requirements for the agencies to follow to ensure that all responsible vendors are
allowed to compete for the above procurements and that fair and reasonable prices are paid
for the service. OFPP should consider, as a possible alternative prior to designing a plan, a
system in which all qualified persons capable of providing specified services are placed on a
list maintained by the government, in which each of those persons is encouraged to submit
a competitive proposal in response to each solicitation for such services, and in which the
award is made to the bidder on the list who can perform the service for the lowest overall
cost.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy should also, in conducting the study, consult
with experts in such fields as soil engineering, real estate appraising, surveying and map-
ping, and other professional services which do not fit within the traditional concept of Fed-
eral procurement procedures.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H. R. REP. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1438 (1984). See also H. R.
REP. 1157, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. at 28 (1984).
These Reports demonstrate that Congress in 1984 realized that in obtaining professional serv-
ices price should not always be the sole basis for choice but that the problems in obtaining such
services on a competitive basis might justify special procurement procedures.
125 See infra notes 129 and 134 and accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 297-309 and accompanying text.
127 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 78-79 (1981). See generally Lovitky, supra note 48, at 338-9.
Prior to the 1984 Act, professional services contracts, including those under § 3109, were ex-
empt from advertising. See 5 U.S.C. § 3109(b)(3) (1982); 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1982); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c)(4)
(1982). After the 1984 Act the advertising requirements of § 5 do "not apply to the procurement of
property or services [made] by an executive agency pursuant to this subchapter [the CICA]." 41
U.S.C. § 260 (1982). That legal services may be exempt from advertising under 41 U.S.C. § 5 (as
amended in 1983) as professional services does not, however, establish that they are exempt from
the CICA. Exemptions from the latter must be "express." See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1) (Supp. III
1985).
The 1984 Act further provides that "[any provision of law which authorizes an executive agency
... to procure any property or services without advertising or without regard to said section 5 of this
title shall be construed to authorize the procurement of such property or services pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter relating to procedures other than sealed-bid procedures." 41 U.S.C. § 260
(Supp. III 1985). This provision has obvious reference to 5 U.S.C. § 3109, see id at § 3109(b)(3),
and arguably confirms the continued viability of 61 Comp. Gen. 69, 78-79 (1981).




the Act are not implicated and the agency need not comply with the
CICA.129 Since, however, the possibility of favoritism is present even
where public funds are not at stake and such favoritism adversely impacts
the public's view of its government, there are some good reasons not to
construe the statute so restrictively. In fact the construction of the CICA
as applicable to non-appropriated funds is supported by the fact that in
enacting the 1986 Debt Collection Amendments Congress indicated
both that the CICA applied to the contracting for legal services there
authorized and that contingency fees (i.e., non-appropriated funds) would
be the usual mode of payment for attorneys retained. 30
3. Competition in Contracting Act
3 1
In 1984 Congress amended the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act 132 and the Armed Services Procurement Act.' 33 It deter-
mined that two of their principal shortcomings were their failure to "give
proper accordance to negotiation as a legitimate competitive procure-
ment procedure" and to "adequately restrict the use of noncompetitive
negotiation."'13 4 The focus of the following discussion of the new re-
quirements applicable to procurement, which were adopted to solve
these problems, is on procurement in the civilian sector, though similar
procedures apply to military procurement. 3 5 Even here, there are some
provisions of the CICA which appear largely irrelevant to procurement
of attorney services' 3 6 or whose application in that context is likely to be
rare. 13 7 Such provisions will not be discussed. Moreover, the analysis
will attempt to give a general overview of the statute, rather than probe
its subtleties.
129 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 297, 98th Cong.,- 1st Sess. 3 (1983): "The last, and possibly the most
important, benefit of competition is its inherit appeal of'fair play.' Competition maintains the integ-
rity in the expenditure ofpublicfunds by ensuring that government contracts are awarded on the basis
of merit rather than favoritism." Id. (emphasis added).
By its terms the FAR applies only to the use of appropriated funds. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.103,
2.101 (1986). This may, however, merely reflect the fact that the statutory procurement counterpart
to the CICA in the defense area is made expressly applicable only to services "for which payment is
to be made from appropriated funds." 10 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (Supp. III 1985). It is significant that the
CICA lacks such a provision.
130 See infra notes 233-39 and 276-85 and accompanying text (though, of course, the loans recov-
ered here may have originally come from appropriated funds). However, payment of expenses of
suit such as filing fees will apparently come out of appropriated funds. See Private Lawyers See Riches in
Federal Debt Collection, Legal Times, Feb. 16, 1987 at 1.
131 Pub. L. No. 98-369 98 Stat. 1175,July 18, 1984.
132 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (1982).
133 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-16 (1982).
134 See, e.g., H. R. REP. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1421 (1984). See generally Cohen, The Competi-
lion in Contracting Act, 14 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 1 (1983).
135 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-16 (Supp. III 1985).
136 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 253b(f) (Supp. III 1985) (planning solicitation for award of a develop-
ment contract for a major system).
137 See, e.g., id § 253d (delivery of technical data).
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Except as otherwise expressly authorized by another statute 3 8 or by
various provisions contained in the CICA itself,1 39 executive agencies
40
138 Section 252(a) mandates that "executive agencies" make contracts for services in accordance
with 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60. See 41 U.S.C. § 252(a) (1982). It provides, however, that those sections
do not apply "when this chapter is made inapplicable pursuant to section 474 of Title 40 or any
other law." Id. See also Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1905, 1911 n.19 (1980) (reading
§ 252(a)(2) "to refer exclusively to statutory provisions that ... in express terms exempt procure-
ments from §§ 251 through 260 of Title 41 or from the FPASA in its entirety"). Section 253(a)(I)
basically reiterates this by specifying, inter alia, that "except in the case of procurement procedures
otherwise expressly authorized by statute," executive agencies must procure services through "full
and open competition." Id. § 253(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). In short, in the civilian procurement area,
the competitive scheme of the CICA applies unless another statutory clearly provides otherwise.
Section 252(a) further indicates that when the CICA "is made inapplicable by any such provi-
sion, section 5 . . . of this title [41 U.S.C. § 5 which requires advertising for proposals] shall be
applicable in the absence of authority conferred by statute to procure without advertising or without
regard to said section 5 of this title." 41 U.S.C. § 252(a)(2) (1982). One of the statutes referred to
in the last clause of§ 252(a)(2) is 5 U.S.C. § 3109 (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 70 for the full text
of the latter provision. However, § 260 of the CICA further provides:
Sections 5, 8 and 13 of this title shall not apply to the procurement of property or services
made by an executive agency pursuant to this chapter. Any provisions of law which author-
ize an executive agency (other than an executive agency which is exempted from the provi-
sions of this chapter by section 252(a) of this title), to procure any property or services
without advertising or without regard to said section 5 of this title shall be construed to
authorize the procurement of guch property or services pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter relating to the procedures other than sealed-bid procedures.
41 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. III 1985). The last sentence of § 260 thus clearly indicates that when 5
U.S.C. § 3109 is relied upon as a source of procurement (not appointment) authority, the competi-
tive procurement procedures of the CICA may ("shall be construed to authorize," not require) be
followed. Moreover since § 3109 purports to be merely an exemption from 41 U.S.C. § 5 and not
from §§ 251-60, procurement of services under § 3109 is subject to the CICA.
In short unless a statute otherwise provides, CICA applies in the civilian sector to the procure-
ment of services. Where a statute clearly makes CICA inapplicable, procurement of services is sub-
ject to the advertising requirements of 41 U.S.C. § 5-unless there is a statutory exception to that
provision. Section 3109 is a statutory exception to § 5 but not §§ 251-60.
139 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 253(b), (c), (g) (Supp. III 1985).
140 See 41 U.S.C. § 252(a) (1982). The term, "executive agency" is not defined in § 259 of the
Act which is the definitional provision. See 41 U.S.C. § 259 (Supp. III 1985). It is, however, defined
in 40 U.S.C. § 472 (1982) and that definition has been taken to be applicable to the competition
provisions. See, e.g., Flight Int'l Group, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 583 F. Supp. 674, 679-
80 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
Section 472(a) provides that the term "executive agency" means "any executive department or
independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government, including any wholly owned
government corporation." 40 U.S.C. § 472(a) (1982). The FAR is in accord. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101
(1987) ("executive department, military department, or any independent establishment within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 and 104(1), respectively, and any wholly owned Government cor-
poration within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 9101."). See also 41 U.S.C. § 403(1) (Supp. III 1985).
The executive departments are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) to include State, Treasury,
Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, Transportation, Energy and Education. (However, the Department of De-
fense, the Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are expressly ex-
empt from 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-60 (though similar procurement provisions apply to them under 10
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2316). Under 5 U.S.C. § 104 (1982), an "independent establishment" is "an estab-
lishment in the executive branch (other than the United States Postal Service or the Postal Rate
Commission) which is not an Executive department, military department, Government corporation,
or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment" and the GAO. But see Flight Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 583 F. Supp. at 679 n.4 (rejecting that the meaning of "in-
dependent establishment" in section 472(a) necessarily is defined by 5 U.S.C. § 104). A "govern-
ment corporation" is a corporation owned or controlled by the government of the United States. 5
U.S.C. § 103 (1982). The distinction between a "mixed-ownership Government corporation" and
"a wholly owned Government corporation" is drawn in 31 U.S.C. § 9101 (1982) by a specific identi-
fication of which government corporations fall into these two categories. For example, the FDIC and
Federal Home Loan Banks, the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility are
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conducting a procurement for services are required to "obtain full and
open competition"1 41 and "use the competitive procedure or combina-
tion of competitive procedures that is best suited under the circum-
stances of the procurement."'142 The term, "full and open competition,"
means that all responsible sources are permitted to submit competitive
proposals on the procurement. 1
43
While sealed bids constitute one type of competitive procedure sanc-
tioned (and sometimes required) by the statute,144it is probably not re-
quired in the case of procurement of attorney services, since in most, if
not all instances, such contracts will not be made solely on the basis of
price and other price-related factors.' 45 Therefore a request for compet-
itive proposals (RCP) will be the requisite method of competitive
procurement.
146
The statute provides seven general exceptions from the require-
ments of full and open competition and use of competitive proce-
dures. 147 Three appear to be of more than passing relevance with regard
to legal services contracts:
(1) the property or services needed by the executive agency are avail-
able from only one responsible source and no other type of property
or services will satisfy the needs of the executive agency;
148
(2) the executive agency's need for the property or services is of such
an unusual and compelling urgency that the Government would be
seriously injured unless the executive agency is permitted to limit the
number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals. 149
designated as "mixed ownership." The FSLIC and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation are
"wholly owned."
Significantly for present purposes, it would therefore appear that except to the extent statutes
otherwise provide, the so-called "independent agencies," such as the FTC, and the wholly owned
government corporations, like the FSLIC and PBGC, are subject to the CICA, at least with regard to
certain of their functions.
141 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
142 lId at § 253(a)(1)(B). Congress has indicated that "a fair proportion of the total purchases
and contracts for property and services for the Government shall be placed with small-business con-
cerns." 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (Supp. III 1985). "Competitive procedures" within the meaning of the
CICA include "procurements conducted in furtherance of Section 644 of title 15 as long as all re-
sponsible business concerns that are entitled to submit offers for such procurements are permitted
to compete." 41 U.S.C. § 259(b)(4) (Supp. III 1985). Finally, the CICA expressly provides that an
"executive agency may provide for the procurement of property or services covered by... [§ 253]
using competitive procedures, but excluding other than small business concerns in furtherance of
sections 638 and 644 of Title 15." 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
The regulations of the Small Business Administration include "legal services" as a category of
"small business" where the size of the business concern is not more than $3.5 million in annual
receipts. 13 C.F.R. § 121.2 (1986). The FAR itself contains regulations for procurement as it affects
small businesses, see 48 C.F.R. § 19 (1986), but it appears to impose a $2 million cap on receipts of a
provider of legal services in order to qualify as "small." l at § 19.102-5.
143 Id 41 U.S.C. §§ 259(c), 403(7) (Supp. III 1985).
144 Id at § 253(a)(2)(A).
145 Id. at § 253(a)(2)(A)(ii). See supra note 124.
146 Id at § 253(a)(2)(B).
147 Id at § 253(c).
148 Id at § 253(c)(1). Where, for instance, in the geographical area where the services are to be
rendered, only one lawyer or firm has the necessary expertise, this section may be applicable. This
exception has in fact been relied upon by agencies in obtaining legal services.
149 Id at § 253(c)(2).
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(7) the head of the executive agency
(A) determines that it is necessary in the public interest to use pro-,
cedures other than competitive procedures in the particular procure-
ment concerned, and
(B) notifies the Congress in writing of such determination not less
than 30 days before the award of the contract. 150
Even where exception (2) applies, the agency is required to "request
offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the circum-
stances."' 15 Moreover, an agency may not award a contract using proce-
dures other than competitive procedures based on exceptions (1) or (2)
unless the contracting officer justifies the action in writing and certain
approvals are obtained.1 52 If, however, exception (2) is relied upon, the
required justification and approvals may be made after the contract is
awarded. 155 The format for the justification is prescribed.1 54 The statute
requires, in part, that the agency expressly determine that the anticipated
cost will be fair and reasonable.' 55 It is not permissible to justify the use
of procedures other than competitive procedures "on the basis of the
lack of advance planning."'
156
The language of the exceptions and the procedures that accompany
their use suggest that they should be only sparingly invoked.' 57 With
regard to attorneys' services, they would appear to be of relatively lim-
ited use.'
58
There is one additional exception from the requirement that agen-
cies "obtain full and open competition though the use of competitive
procedures" that might be significant from the point of view of legal
services contracts. Specifically, in the case of contracts for an amount
which does not exceed $25,000,159 the statute authorizes the adoption of
"special simplified procedures" 6 0 "[i]n order to promote efficiency and
economy in contracting and to avoid unnecessary burdens for agencies
and contractors."' 6 ' However, in using these procedures, an agency
150 Id. at § 253(c)(7)(A), (B).
151 Id. at § 253(e).
152 Id. at § 253(0(1).
153 Id. at § 253(0(2).
154 Id. at § 253(0(3).
155 Id. at § 253(0(3)(C). The justification must also include a description of the agency's needs,
identification of the exception relied upon, a demonstration based on the contractor's qualifications
or nature of procurement of the reasons for using the exception, a description of the market survey
conducted or reasons why it was not conducted, a listing of sources expressing interest in procure-
ment, and a statement of actions the agency may take to remove barriers to competition in the
future. Id. § 253(f)(3)(A), (B), (D)-(F). This justification must be available for public inspection. Id.
at § 253(0(4)..
156 Id. at § 253(f)(5)(A).
157 See Ruttinger, Acquiring the Services of Neutralsfor Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution and Negoti-
ated Rulemaking, 1986 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS at 881 ("... the market surveys, sole source determinations, and gamut of agency approvals
required by Parts 6 and 7 of the FAR may make it difficult for an agency to proceed on a sole source
basis in a timely fashion.").
158 See infra notes 415-18 and accompanying text.
159 41 U.S.C. § 253(g)(2) (1982).




must "promote competition to the maximum extent practicable."' 162
Further discussion of those procedures will be postponed until the exam-
ination of the FAR.' 63
The CICA requires that each solicitation for competitive proposals
(other than for small purchases) must include at a minimum a statement
of all significant factors, including price, which the agency expects to
consider in evaluating the proposals, along with the relative importance
assigned to each of those factors.' 64 In the case of competitive propos-
als, there must be "a statement that the proposals are intended to be
evaluated with, and awards made after, discussions with the offerors, but
might be evaluated and awarded without discussions with the
offerors."1
65
The time and place for submission of proposals must also be in-
cluded in the solicitation.' 6 6 Specifications included in the solicitation
must be developed "in such manner as is necessary to obtain full and
open competition with due regard to the nature of the... services to be
acquired."'
67
Except where one of the exceptions from the use of competitive pro-
cedures is applicable, 168 agencies intending to solicit proposals for a con-
tract for services for a price expected to exceed $10,000 must furnish the
Secretary of Commerce a notice for publication in the Commerce Business
Daily.169 Among other things, this notice must accurately describe the
services contracted for. 170 If interested in submitting a proposal, a pro-
spective contractor can then make a business judgment whether to re-
quest a copy of the solicitation. 17' Where these notices are required,
agencies are limited with respect to the time when they may issue a solici-
tation and with regard to setting deadlines for the submittal of
proposals.
172
162 Id. at § 25 3 (g)(4). See also Ruttinger, supra note 157, at 888-95 for a discussion of various
specific procurement techniques that may [or may not] be applicable to obtaining attorney services-
small purchases, indefinite supply contracts, basic ordering agreements, blanket purchasing agree-
ments and supply schedules.
163 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
164 41 U.S.C. § 253a(b)(l)(A); (B) (1982).
165 Id at § 253a(b)(2)(B)(i).
166 Id. at § 253a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
167 Id. at § 253a(a)(1)(C). In preparing for the procurement the agency must also "specify its
needs and solicit bids or proposals in a manner designed to achieve full and open competition," and
"use advance procurement planning and market research." Id. at § 253a(a)(1)(A), (B). Each solici-
tation must include specifications which permit full and open competition and "include restrictive
provisions or conditions only to the extent necessary to satisfy the needs of the executive agency or
as authorized by law." Id. at § 253a(a)(2)(A), (B). The type of specification shall depend "'on the
nature of the needs of the executive agency and the market available to satisfy such needs." Id at
§ 253a(a)(3).
168 41 U.S.C. § 416(c)(2) (1982). Exception (1) (sole source) to § 253 is not exempt from the
notice requirements. See id. at § 416(2). See also id § 416(3) (no notice ifdetermination it would not
be "reasonable" or "appropriate" to issue it).
169 Id. at § 416(a)(1).
170 Idt at § 416(b)(1).
171 ,Id.
172 Idt at § 416(a)(3).
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The statute requires the agency to evaluate competitive proposals
based solely on the factors specified in the solicitation. 173 It may reject
all proposals if the agency head determines that such action is in the pub-
lic interest. 1
74
The agency has the discretion to have discussions with offerors with
regard to their proposals prior to any award.' 75 If it chooses to do so, it
must conduct discussions, oral or written, with all responsible sources
who submit proposals within the competitive range. Such sources are
identified by considering only price and the other factors included in the
solicitation. 176 Or the agency can award the contract without such dis-
cussions "when it can be clearly demonstrated from the existence of full
and open competition or accurate prior cost experience with the... ser-
vice that acceptance of an initial proposal without discussions would re-
sult in the lowest overall cost to the Government."' 177 Unless all
proposals are rejected, the agency must award the contract with "reason-
able promptness to the responsible source whose proposal is most ad-
vantageous to the United States, considering only price and the other
factors included in the solicitation."'' 78 A "responsible source" means a
prospective contractor 179 who, inter alia, "has a satisfactory performance
record,"' 80 "a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics,"181
and who "has the necessary organization, experience, accounting and
operational controls, and technical skills, or the ability to obtain such
organization, experience, controls, and skills."'
18 2
In addition the statute regulates the types of contracts that may be
executed 183 and requires that any contract awarded expressly permit ex-
amination of the relevant books and records of the contractor by the
GAO.184
4. Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation, which is found in title 48 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, chapter 1,185 is prepared, issued and main-
tained jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General
173 Id. at § 253b(a). See GAO opinion in Matter of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, B-
221363.2 (May 28, 1986) (unpublished) (contract award protest rejected on basis that while the
protester promised a lower price, technical qualifications of another proposal justified award to an-
other law firm).
174 41 U.S.C. § 253b(b) (1982). There are also provisions for "qualification requirements"
(designed for quality assurance) that might perhaps apply to the legal services area. Id. at § 253(c).
175 Id. at § 253b(d)(1).
176 Id. at § 253b(d)(2). In retaining attorneys, such pre-award discussion would appear to be a
likely occurrence.
177 Id. at § 253b(d)(1)(B).
178 Id. at § 253b(d)(4).
179 Id. at §§ 259(c), 403(8).
180 Id. at § 403(8)(C).
181 Id. at § 403(8)(D).
182 Id. at § 403(8)(E). It has been estimated that the full competition process consumes a mini-
mum of two to three months. See Ruttinger, supra note 157, at 879. See also infra note 205 and
accompanying text.
183 41 U.S.C. § 254(a), (b) (1982).
184 Id. at § 254(c).
185 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1986).
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Services, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration under their respective statutory authorities.18 6 It applies
to acquisitions of property and services by contract with appropriated
funds.18 7 By its terms, therefore, this system of regulations would appear
to be inapplicable in the case of executive agencies in those instances
where attorneys' fees are paid out of the funds collected. 18 8 Such may be
the case with respect to the 1986 Debt Collection Amendments pursuant
to which contingency fee agreements may be used and are in fact the
preferred fee arrangement.' 8 9
For current purposes the contents of the FAR largely repeat the stat-
utory requirements for competitive procurement described above and
need not be repeated here. 190
The procedures for so-called "small purchases" (acquisitions of
services in 'the amount of $25,000 or less) apply only to non-personal
services contracts.19 1 Purchases of $1,000 and uhder may be made with-
out securing competitive quotations if the contracting officer considers
the price to be reasonable. 192 For contracts in excess of that amount,
there is a requirement of solicitation of quotations from a reasonable
number of sources in order to promote competition to the maximum ex-
tent practicable.' 93
5. OFPP's Study of Professional Services Contracting
Section 2753 of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 directed
that
Not later than January 31, 1985, the Administrator of the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy complete a study of alternatives and rec-
ommend to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and
the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Repre-
sentatives a plan to increase the opp6rtunities to achieve full and open
competition on the basis of technical qualifications, quality, and other
factors in the procurement of professional, technical, and managerial
services. 194
The study 195 was completed on schedule and transmitted to Con-
gress. While legal services were considered to be "professional services"
within the meaning of the statute, 196 'the associations of many profes-
sions, including ... law'. . . did not submit comments or participate in the
proceedings of the study."' 197 The final report suggests that this appar-
186 Id at § 1.102(b). Agencies may, within limits, issue acquisition regulations that implement or
supplement the FAR. Id. at § 1.301(a)(1).
187 Id. at § 2.101.
188 But see supra note 130.
189 See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text. But see supra note 130.
190 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. pt. 6 (1986).
191 Id. at §§ 13.000, 13.101.
192 Id. at § 13.106(a)(1).
193 Id. at § 13.106(b)(1).
194 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1203 (1984).
195 Office of Federal Procurement Policy, STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CONTRACTING (Jan.
1985) [hereinafter "OFPP Study"].
196 OFPP Study, supra note 195, Appendix C at 35.
197 Id at 3.
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ent lack of interest might have been attributable to satisfaction with the
present contracting process. 198
In summarizing its findings, the report noted that those private or-
ganizations participating in the study identified what they believed were
various problems prevalent in the contracting practices of many govern-
ment agencies:' 99
(1) the tendency of price to dominate in the contractor selection
process; 200
(2) the difficulty of developing good statements of work;20
198 Id.
199 Notes 200-05, infra, extensively cite from OFPP Study because of the background information
dealing with government contracting contained therein that is relevant generally to the legal service
area as well as for the observations that may be specifically relevant to the hiring of outside counsel.
200 Dominance of Price
Traditionally, the preferred method of procurement within Government has been formal adver-
tising. Under the formally advertised, sealed bid method, the work to be performed is described in
sufficient detail to permit award to the lowest, responsive, responsible bidder without pre-award
discussions. Price is the sole criterion for selecting a contractor from among the responsive, respon-
sible bidders.
In service contracting, pre-award discussions are generally considered necessary, because it is
difficult to develop a sufficiently detailed description and understanding of the work to be performed
to permit award of a contract without discussion. The procurement regulations provide for pre-
award discussions and the use of "the negotiated method of procurement" where sufficiently de-
tailed specifications cannot be developed to permit formal advertising.
The negotiated method of procurement, in addition to permitting discussions, permits a con-
tract award to be based on factors other than price. Price, in terms of dollars, however, is easily
understood and simple to apply as a selection criteria. One of the recurring criticisms received from
the private sector during the course of the study was that the Government tends to "take the easy
way out" and accept low-priced offers rather than justify the acceptance of higher-priced, technically
superior ones.
The tendency of price to be a dominant factor in selecting a professional service contractor is a
long-standing issue. In 1972, Congressman Jack Brooks recognized the ingrained nature of price
competition in Government procurement and sponsored and guided into law H.R. 12807 (now The
Brooks A-E Selection Statute-Pub. L. No. 92-582). The statute effectively prohibits the selection of
architects-engineers for Government work on the basis of price competition.
The controversy over the respective roles of "price" and "technical merit" as factors influencing
the selection of a contractor to perform professional services has continued during the 12 years since
the enactment of the statute. Competition and price competition are often thought of as synony-
mous. Competition is fundamental to Federal procurement, and even though the procurement reg-
ulations encourage technical competition, it is perceived by many that the spirit in which the
regulations are implemented often stresses price. This has caused problems in professional services
contracting, and the Government is sometimes accused of being "penny-wise and pound-foolish"
when it accepts offers primarily on the basis of price. OFPP Study, supra note 195, at 4.
201 Poor Statements of Work
The definition of the work to be performed under a service contract is crucial. If the work is not
properly defined and described, the result will be a misunderstanding and controversy. Unfortu-
nately, there is no universal method for writing high quality statements of work. Each statement
must be tailored to the particular task to be performed and the quality level of services required.
Some tasks lend themselves to explicit definition; others are best described in terms of mission need
or performance requirements.
The statement of work is a part of the contract and is binding on both the contractor and Gov-
ernment. Since the written words in the statement translate into cost and profit, poorly written
statements may create misunderstandings and lead to adversary or unproductive relationships be-
tween the Government and its contractors. Some contractors offering comments on the study indi-
cated there is no such thing as a perfect statement of work. These contractors state that the only way
the Government can protect itself and be assured of obtaining the best value is to negotiate the exact
task to be performed (not how it will be performed) after a contractor is selected. Otherwise, the
contractors maintain, gamesmanship will occur.
The form of gamesmanship alluded to by the contractors purportedly occurs when a contractor
spots a flaw, omission, or ambiguous term in the statement of work, but does not mention it until
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(3) the use of procedures that result in technical leveling;20 2
after the contract has been awarded. If the contractor spotting the flaw or omission is awarded the
contract, the problem is then brought to the attention of the Government, and a change order is
required. The contractor, then, has the opportunity to "get well" on the change order, as competi-
tion no longer exists.
In any event, the Government's best protection against the occurrence of gamesmanship is to
express the services to be performed in clear, simple, and legally enforceable terms. In all situations,
however, the Government is, to a certain extent, dependant on the professionalism of the contractor
performing the task. There is no method totally effective in preventing gamesmanship. Industry
spokesmen suggested that the circulation of draft work statements would help improve the overall
quality and specificity of the statements. Government personnel indicated that detailed discussions
of the statement of work during negotiations, when coupled with thorough cost analysis, examina-
tion of a contractor's past performance, and the establishment of negotiated ceilings on certain cost
elements, were generally adequate to protect the Government from possible gamesmanship and
from the problem of buy-ins. OFPP Study, supra note 195, at 5.
202 Technical Leveling
Section 15.610 of the FAR defines technical leveling as, "helping an offeror to bring its proposal
up to the level of other proposals through successive rounds of discussion, such as by pointing out
weaknesses resulting from the offeror's lack of diligence, competence, or inventiveness in preparing
the proposal."
Although prohibited by the FAR, technical leveling was, perhaps, the most frequent complaint
received from the private sector during the course of this study. One of the organizations testifying
at the September 13, 1984, public meeting described technical leveling as:
Technical leveling.., typically occurs in a negotiated procurement situation where techni-
cal portions of proposals are initially evaluated and scored, along with the cost proposals.
After the initial evaluation and scoring, there ensues a process (commonly referred to as
discussions, negotiations, or offer clarification) where the technical scores are converged to
the point where at least the top two or three proposals are not only in a competitive range,
but very close, often separated by only a few points on a scale of 100. This results in a level
profile of technical proposals within the competitive range which, defacto, shifts the atten-
tion to cost as the factor to determine the ultimate selection. Cost, in turn, is often "low-
balled" or simply unrealistic in terms of the nature of the service requirement.
The combination of the technical leveling and the consequent shift to cost as the award
determinant is bureaucratically and politically compelling; that is, source selection authori-
ties and source evaluation board members find it difficult to not simply take the safe course
of action, which is to select the low bid if it can be rationalized as "realistic."
The net effect of the above process for the Government manager seeking highest qual-
ity is truly perverse: he or she is forced to accept a source who may be just qualified, as
opposed to a source who is demonstrably the best qualified and most competent and most likely
to perform satisfactorily against demanding high quality requirements; and he or she often
faces a significant possibility of a cost overrun and/or serious performance shortfall.
In considering technical leveling, as described above, it must be kept in mind that a legitimate
role of negotiations is to clarify ambiguities and identify deficiencies in the proposals of all offerors
having the potential to receive an award so that the offerors are given an opportunity to meet the
Government's requirements. In those instances when discussions result in the elimination of techni-
cal problems, the Government is often justified in making an award, based on cost, between equally
satisfactory proposals.
In May 1984, the GAO issued a decision (B-212675) involving Harrison Systems Ltd., who pro-
tested the award of a contract by the United States Information Agency. The contract was for the
design and installation of a studio control room and technical operations facilities. The decision
illustrates the complexity and subtlety of the judgments required to prevent technical leveling and,
at the same time, protect the Government. In its decision, GAO ruled:
Even though the solicitation states that technical factors will be weighted 70 percent and
price 30 percent, and award will be made to the offeror with the highest combined point
total, the agency may properly award to a lower technically rated, lower priced offeror with
lower combined point total because the contracting officer made a reasonable determina-
tion that there was no significant technical differences between the proposals and award to
the lower priced offeror was most advantageous to the Government, notwithstanding that
there was a 14.4 percent difference in the technical scores of the highest scored offeror and
the offeror receiving the award.
GAO had previously issued decisions on both sides of the issue regarding a contracting officer's
discretion in implementing the award criteria specified in the solicitation. In an RCA Service Com-
pany decision (B-202871), August 22, 1983, GAO ruled that:
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(4) the lack of cost realism and the occurrence of "buy-ins;" '20 3
Even where the RFP evaluation factors indicated that award would be made to that offeror
with the highest point score, we have held that before the contracting agency can award to
the highest priced (or higher cost) technically superior offeror, the contracting agency is
required to justify such award in the light of the extra expenditure required.
In its Telecommunications Management Corporation decision, 57 Comp. Gen. 251, 1978, GAO in-
dicated that:
Where the solicitation sets forth a precise numerical evaluation formula, including price,
and provides that the awardee will be selected on the basis of total score, the contracting
agency must award to the highest scored offeror if the source selection official agrees with
the scoring.
GAO, in issuing B-212675, acknowledged that the RCA and Telecommunications Management Cor-
poration decisions were "somewhat inconsistent." GAO summed up its views by stating:
While we think that both cases were decided correctly, the relevant statements went beyond
what was necessary to decide the cases. We now think that both views are too extreme. The
better view, which we adopt, is that when the RFP contains a precise numerical evaluation
formula, including cost/price, and a statement that award will be made to the highest point
scored offerors, the contracting officer or other source selection authority retains the dis-
cretion to examine the technical point scores to determine whether a point differential be-
tween offerors represents any actual significant difference in technical merit. If it does not,
then award may be made to the l6wer cost or priced proposal, even though its total point
score is lower. In effect, the contracting official would be rescoring the technical proposals
conceptually, but not mechanically, and would not really be altering the predetermined
cost/technical tradeoff. If, however, the source selection official determines that the point
difference represents actual technical superiority and he agrees with the scoring, then he
must abide by the formula and award to the offeror with the highest total point score. He
may not decide that the technical superiority is not worth the cost difference. That would
alter the predetermined cost/technical tradeoff. Additionally, we think that if the award is
to be made to a more expensive higher total point scored offeror in accordance with the
formula, there is no necessity for the contracting agency to make a separate determination
that the extra expense is justified, since that determination is made when the formula is
devised.
OFPP Study, supra note 195, at 7-9.
203 Buy Ins
Buy ins may occur in service contracting, as in other types of contracting, when a contractor
knowingly understates the estimated cost and, therefore, the proposed contract price. This may be
done in expectation of obtaining the proposed contract and then increasing the price through
change orders or during follow-on contracts. Buy ins also occur, however, in certain instances, when
a contractor is attempting to "break into" the market. These contractors are sometimes willing to
take an initial contract at cost, or even at a loss, in order to establish a performance record for future
contracts.
Evaluating proposals received in response to a service requirement and ascertaining whether
the proposed work can be performed for the offered price is sometimes difficult. The capability of
offerors to meet the Government's needs is based almost entirely on information submitted by the
offerors, each of whom has a vested interest in obtaining the proposed contract. The equipment,
facilities, and personnel capabilities required to perform some services can be evaluated with some
certainty. The performance of many services, though, requires intellectual skills and creativity. It is
difficult, at best, to estimate, with the value of that knowledge, or how the personnel will use their
expertise to efficiently and effectively perform a task or service.
Several persons and organizations suggested that past performance on comparable contracts
(particularly with regard to cost realism) is the best way to judge an offeror's probability of perform-
ing in the future. They recommended that past performance carry "more weight" in selecting con-
tractors for future work and that Government personnel be given specific training in evaluating price
proposals.
Acceptable past performance, of course, is based on a contractor's past history of performing
the required tasks at the desired quality level, on time, within budget, and in conformance with all
contractual requirements. A contractor who has performed in this manner in the past will."have a
good track record." That does not mean, however, that new offerors may not also perform well or
even better. It, also, does not mean that good track records should not be discounted when the
purchasing official has a reasonable basis to believe they no longer accurately reflect the offeror's
ability or willingness to perform. OFPP Study, supra note 195, at 6.
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(5) the shortage of highly trained contracting personnel; 20 4 and
(6) the length of time required to award a contract.
20 5
Of course, it is possible that the same or similar problems exist in
the area of government procurement of legal services. The lack of com-
plaints by the legal contracting sector during the study may have re-
flected either satisfaction or simply ignorance that the study was
proceeding.
The Government contracting community apparently was largely sat-
isfied with the existing contracting process20 6 and agency representatives
to the OFPP task group did not agree with industry perceptions regard-
ing the pervasiveness of the problems noted above.2 0 7 "Contracting offi-
cials stated that current procedures provide for the proper consideration
of both cost and technical factors and that contract award can now be
made on the basis of technical and quality factors when appropriate to do
so. ' '208 Apparently the OFPP study had little generative significance in'
the contracting area.
III.. Debt Collection Amendments of 1986
A. Introduction
On November 3, 1986 President Reagan approved Pub. L. No. 99-
578 which establishes a pilot program for the retention of attorneys en-
gaged in private practice in an effort to collect the non-tax indebtedness
owed to the United States. In enacting this legislation Congress ad-
dressed various issues that are relevant outside the area of debt collec-
204 Need for Better Trained Personnel
In addition to revealing the complexities involved in developing and administering criteria for
awarding professional services contracts, GAO's ruling in B-212675 indicates that contracting is not
an exact science or a mechanical process. Trained contracting personnel are essential to maintain-
ing the delicate balance required within the system between sufficient operating flexibility to protect
the Government's interests and the structure required to maintain its integrity.
Contracting, whether for services or hardware, requires the exercise of sound judgment. There
is no substitute for skilled, competent personnel. Trained personnel will often succeed in obtaining
a good contract, notwithstanding the constraints imposed by the contracting methodology em-
ployed. Conversely, untrained personnel may produce an unworkable contract, notwithstanding an
effective contracting process.
Several major organizations commented that the current problem in professional services con-
tracting stems from attitudes of the personnel doing the contracting and not necessarily from inade-
quate regulations or procedures. Training in professional services contracting was stressed as a
means of altering the perception attributed to many contracting personnel that, rightly or wrongly,
the "low offer is always the best and safest." OFPP Study, supra note 195 at 9-10.
205 Long Procurement Lead Times
Procurement administrative lead time (PALT) is generally regarded as the total time required to
process a procurement action, beginning with the time a procurement request is received in the
procurement office and ending with the award of the contract. Industry and Government officials,
both, acknowledge that the procurement cycle "simply takes too long." The Professional Services
Council reported that, in their members' experience: (1) it usually takes a year between the drafting
of a scope of work and the award of a contract; and (2) it almost always takes from 4-6 months for an
agency to award a contract after receipt of proposals. Problems occurring as a result of the long
processing times include: higher prices because of built-in escalation factors; difficulty of scheduling
and retaining key personnel; a change in requirements over time; and a reduction in the number and
quality of competing firms. OFPP Study, supra note 195, at 10.
206 Id. at 3.
207 Id.
208 Id. at vii.
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tion. For that reason, detailed consideration of the new statute and its
legislative history is required.
As of September 30, 1985, non-tax delinquent debts owed to the
federal government had grown to $23.6 billion, double the $11.7 billion
reported outstanding in fiscal year 1981.209 Without litigation to recover
these amounts it was estimated that $6.7 million was lost each day due to
the running of the statute of limitations.2 10 Under existing law, judicial
enforcement of claims fell to the Department of Justice2 11 which, given
other matters deemed to be of higher priority,212 purportedly lacked the
resources to mount an effective debt collection campaign in the
courts. 213 Moreover, since efficient and effective debt collection was be-
lieved to require some experience with debtor psychology and tech-
niques to avoid payment as well as knowledge of state laws with regard to
post-judgment remedies, 214 employment of private counsel appeared to
Congress to be a viable alternative method of collection. 215 Testimony at
hearings held on the legislation indicated that several states had used the
services of private attorneys for debt collection with considerable
success.
216
The legislation that was enacted as the "Debt Collection Amend-
ments" originated in the Senate where hearings were held by the Sub-
committee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. The full Senate approved
the committee-reported bill without amendments on March 19, 1986.217
Similar bills were considered in the House by the Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the
Judiciary. The full Committee reported a bill which was adopted by the
House without amendment on September 29, 1986.218 Some relatively
minor differences between the bills passed by the Senate and House were
resolved when the Senate voted to accept the House version on October
8, 1986.219 The President approved the bill on November 3, appending,
however, a signing statement regarding his interpretation of the
legislation. 22
0
The enacted legislation amends section 3718 of title 31 of the
United States Code.22' Prior to the 1986 amendments, that provision
authorized the head of an executive or legislative agency to make con-
209 S. REP. No. 256, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) [hereinafter S. Debt Report].
210 Id.
211 See 5 U.S.C. § 3106: 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518(b), 519, 547(2) (1982).
212 See H. REP. No. 909, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5605, 5606 [hereinafter H. Debt Report]; S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 2, 3.
213 H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 4; S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 3.
214 See Federal Debt Revovery Act of 1985: Hearing S. 209 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Prolifer-
ation, and Government Processes of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1986)
[hereinafter 1986 Sen. Hearings] (statement of William Guice III).
215 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 6.
216 See 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 35-83.
217 132 Cong. Rec. S2989 (daily ed. March 19, 1986).
218 H.R. 5541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. H8563 (daily ed. September 29, 1986).
219 S. 209, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S15616 (daily ed. October 8, 1986).
220 Statement By President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing S.209, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1464 (Nov. 3, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5619-20.
221 31 U.S.C. § 3718 (1982 and Supp. 11 1983).
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tracts with collection agencies to recover indebtedness owed to the
United States Government.2 22 Now those same officials "may, subject to
the approval of the Attorney General, refer to a private counsel . . .
claims of indebtedness owed the United States arising out of activities of
that agency." 223 Referral is, however, limited to private counsel retained
by the Attorney General pursuant to contracting authority expressly
granted and conditioned by the new legislation.
2 24
For a variety a reasons, including presumably a concern for the
abuses that might arise in its administration, the legislation is limited in a
variety of ways which demonstrate that the program is only experimental.
First of all, the new act is effective for only three years, commencing on
the effective date of implementing regulations issued by the Attorney
General. 225 Those regulations are mandated by the legislation and must
be submitted to Congress at least sixty days before they become effec-
tive. 226 Congress did not expressly specify a date by which the regula-
tions must be issued. However, it did require that within 180 days of the
enactment of the new legislation, the Attorney General submit to Con-
gress a report of the actions taken under his new contracting author-
ity.2 2 7 This might be taken to suggest an assumption by Congress that
the implementing regulations would be in place no later than that date.
The other significant limitation is not temporal but geographical.
The contracting authority can be exercised to obtain legal services in no
more than ten federal judicial districts. 228 While part of the new legisla-
tion appears to vest the Justice Department with total discretion in decid-
ing whether or not to exercise its new authority,229 it was apparently





"The Attorney General may make contracts retaining private coun-
sel to furnish legal services, including representation in negotiation,
compromise, settlement and litigation." 23 ' While the literal language of
the statute could be construed to cover legal services that do not arise
directly from or are not directly related to litigation, the clear focus of
222 31 U.S.C. § 3718(a) (1982).
223 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305,3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 Supp. 11 1984) (adding subsection 3718(b)(2)).
224 Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4).
225 Id. at § 5.
226 Id. at § 4.
227 Id. at § 2.
228 Id. at § 3.
229 Id. at § 1(4).
230 Id. at § 3. The five districts initially chosen encompass Miami, Los Angeles, Detroit, Houston
and New York. Legal Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
231 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 Supp. 11 1984).
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the legislation was on permitting the retention of attorneys to pursue




Each contract is to include "such terms and conditions as the Attor-
ney General considers necessary and appropriate. ' '2 33 One of the most
important of these relates to the compensation paid attorneys who are
hired. Contracts must specify "the amount of the fee to be paid.., or
the method for calculating that fee" 234 and "may provide that a fee a
person charges.., is payable from the amount recovered." 235 The statu-
tory language thus indicates that contingency fees are authorized but not
necessarily required in all instances. 236 However the legislative history
indicates that in the debt collection area payment is generally by contin-
gent fee 237 and Congress expected that in all, or almost all, instances
such a fee arrangement would be the prescribed method of compensa-
tion. 23 8 The prospect of collection of money owed the government with-
out substantial taxpayer cost 239 proved particularly alluring. At the same
time the statute directs that "the amount of the fee payable ... may not
exceed the fee that counsel engaged in the private practice of law in the
area or areas where the legal services are furnished typically charge cli-
ents for furnishing legal services in the collection of claims of indebted-
ness . . 240 Among other things, this provision would seem to mean
that in an area where collection attorneys are not paid on a contingency
basis and the fee charged under the fee structure prevailing there would
be less than that paid under a contingency contract, the Attorney Gen-
eral can (and must) make a fee arrangement in accordance with the local
practice. 2
41
The statute gives no guidance as to how to identify the "typical fee."
Since competitive procedures will be utilized to award these contracts,
the proposals themselves may be some evidence of the "typical fee" in
the area, but it would be difficult to justify reliance solely on those pro-
posals. Some additional investigation, such as a letter survey of a sub-
232 See, e.g., S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 2-4.
233 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 Supp. 11 1984) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(1)(A)).
234 Id.
235 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(2), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718) (amending and redesignating subsection 3718(b)).
236 See also H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 6 ("Such contracts could be made on a fixed fee or
contingent basis.").
237 See, e.g., H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 5.
238 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 7; H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 5.
239 There may be some taxpayer cost to the extent filing, service and other fees and costs of suit
must be advanced from appropriated funds and are not ultimately recovered from the debtor. See
supra note 130.
240 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(1)(A)).
241 Also if the debt instrument provides for the debtor's payment of attorneys' fees, the govern-
mem's attorneys can collect their compensation along with the debt at no cost to the government. S.




stantial portion of the local collection bar and inquiries directed to local
bar associations, would appear to be minimal steps necessary to give
some clear guidance on this matter.
The legislation does, however, indicate that differences in fees
charged by the same attorney for different claims can be justified on the
basis of "the amount, age, and nature of the indebtedness and whether
the debtor is an individual or a business entity." 242 This language sug-
gests that the factors thus enumerated are the only ones that can be used
to support differentials in fees charged for the collection of different
debts. The assumption seems to be that these are factors that generally
enter (or should enter) into the'calculation of the "typical fee" of a col-
lection attorney.
Congress apparently expected that Justice would write contracts
with particular attorneys to cover not just one claim but a large
number.243 In fact, the testimony at the subcommittee level suggested
that the economies of debt collection and facilitation of supervision of
attorneys' work argued in favor of using few rather than many attorneys
or firms. 24 4 On the assumption, therefore, that a contract under the new
act covers a multitude of debts which vary considerably in amount, age,
and nature of the claim and debtor, it is likely that, even where only con-
tingent fees are provided for, the provisions regarding fees charged are
likely to be rather complicated where in fact the "typical" practice of at-
torneys in the area is to vary fees based on such factors.
b. Control
Maintenance of control by the federal government over the activities
of private counsel taken pursuant to these contracts was obviously a mat-
ter of highest import for Congress in drafting this legislation. 245 More-
over, President Reagan in signing the legislation indicated that he did so
"knowing that the Attorney General will take all steps necessary to en-
sure that any contract entered into with private counsel contains provi-
sions requiring ongoing supervision of the private counsel so that all
fundamental decisions, including whether to initiate litigation and
242 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 Supp. 11 1984).
243 See, e.g., S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 7; Federal Claims Collection Act Amendment Hearing on
H.R. 979 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1986) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General Robert Ford).
244 See, e.g., 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 80 (statement of Dr. Dolores Cross).
245 Concerns regarding control and the constitutional problems thereby implicated, see supra
notes 8-15 and accompanying text, have been voiced regarding this program. See Legal Times, Feb.
16, 1987, ("Private Lawyers See Riches in Federal Debt Collection").
For statements in the legislative history indicating the assumption that close control was ex-
pected see, e.g., H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 4 ("In granting this [contract] authority to the
Attorney General, the Committee emphasizes the importance of the protection it has included in the
bill to ensure its proper use"); 132 Cong. Rec. S2987 (daily ed. March 19, 1986) (Statement of Sen.
D'Amato) ("Under the careful supervision of DOJ, and subject to provisions which would protect the
rights of debtors, the use of prinvate counsel will greatly enhance the ability of the Federal Govern-
ment to recover outstanding debt.") (emphasis added). See also H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at
14-15 (letter from MiltonJ. Socolar, Acting Comptroller General of the United States) (emphasizing
needs for control over private attorneys).
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whether to settle or compromise a claim, are executed by an officer of the
United States, as required by the Constitution.-
246
The legislation requires that contracts permit the Attorney General
"to terminate either the contract or the private counsel's representation
... in particular cases if the Attorney General finds that such action is for
the convenience of the Government." 247 Another mandated contractual
provision retains for the head of the agency referring a claim the author-
ity "to resolve a dispute regarding the claim, to compromise the claim, or
to terminate a collection action on the claim." 248 Monthly reports will
have to be submitted by counsel to the Justice Department and the fed-
eral agency referring the claim relating to the services rendered during
the month and the progress during the month in the collection efforts.2 49
While the statute expressly vests the power to enter into these con-
tracts for legal services in the Attorney General, subdelegation within the
Justice Department of the contracting power is apparently permitted.2 50
Whether the Attorney General can delegate it not to his subordinates but
to other federal agencies is less clear. The legislative history itself fo-
cuses on the Justice Department's involvement in the contracting process
and this suggests a negative answer. Realistically speaking, the chance
that Justice would want to delegate the power away seems remote, partic-
ularly given the fact that this is only a pilot program. If the program were
expanded, however, the mechanics of the procurement and monitoring
processes might threaten to consume so much of Justice's resources that
delegation to the General Services Administration or to some of the
agencies with the largest amount of debt outstanding might prove invit-
ing. At that point, express statutory authorization for the delegation
could be sought.
Actual referral of particular cases is expressly vested in the "head"
of executive and legislative agencies "subject to the approval of the At-
torney General." 251 Testimony regarding the legislation suggested that
the Department of Justice would not try to review each case for refer-
ral252 and Congress apparently did not intend to mandate otherwise.2 53
Presumably Justice will formulate criteria indicating which types of cases
should be referred and at what point in the collection effort involvement
of collection counsel is appropriate.2 54 For example, where an indebted-
ness exceeds a particular amount (such as $30,000) Justice may consider
that it should handle the litigation rather than outside counsel. Since
246 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1464 (Nov. 3, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5619. See also supra note 55.
247 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(5)(A)).
248 Id. (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(5)(B)).
249 Id. (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(5)(C)).
250 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1982). See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 3.16-
.18 (1978).
251 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(2)).
252 House Hearings, supra note 243, at 78 (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Rob-
ert Ford).




Justice must under the statute transmit to Congress annual reports deal-
ing with its collection efforts and those of private counsel,255 it will main-
tain continuing general supervision over the collection program.256 With
respect to agency referral decisions, the General Accounting Office com-
mented on the proposed legislation, noting, among other things, the
bill's assumption that "referrals would be made in accordance with uni-
form standards provided in the" Federal Claims Collection Standards.
257
There was considerable discussion during the legislative considera-
tion of the new act regarding whether or not private collection agencies
should be authorized by their contracts to refer particular claims to attor-
neys hired by Justice. 258 The collection agency lobby argued for that
power and, when the bill was first before the Senate, one of the sponsors
of the legislation suggested that the legislation did not prohibit such re-
ferrals. 259 The statutory language vests the referral power in the "head"
of federal agencies, though subdelegation is not expressly forbidden.
The real problem presented here is the extent of discretion which the
agency can grant by contract to the collection firm regarding whether
and when to refer claims to attorneys hired by Justice and to whom a
reference for litigation can be made. The General Accounting Office
urged that strict controls be placed on such referrals.260
One of the strongest arguments with respect to such direct referral
was that, when it comes to collection efforts, the debtor will most likely
respond to the request for payment by a collection agency if he or she
knows that the lack of a prompt response will be met with prompt institu-
tion of suit.26 1 Requiring agency referral or agency consent to referral in
all cases might undercut the effort of this legislation to give some bite to
the prelitigation efforts at collection. It was also argued by the collection
agency lobby that such firms could undertake much of the task of attor-
ney supervision and monitoring that would otherwise consume the time
of the federal agency to whom the debt is owed.262 These arguments
seemed to be directed to establishing a relatively substantial role for col-
lection agencies in the referral process with discretion perhaps vested
there regarding when and to whom reference should be made.
255 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding a new subsection 3718(c)).
256 Ste S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 8.
257 H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 14. See 4 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.4 (1987) (standards for the
administrative collection, compromise, and termination of agency collection efforts, and referral to
GAO and Justice of claims for litigation).
258 See 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 106-150; House Hearings, supra note 243, at 142-
85.
259 See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. S2986 (daily ed. March 19, 1986) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
260 H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 14.
261 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 122.
262 Id. at 142.
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Despite these arguments, the House Report 263 and, perhaps to some
lesser degree, the Senate Report264 suggest that the principle role for the
collection agency in attorney referral is limited to transferring the file to
the attorney chosen by the agency. The decision to litigate and the
choice of litigator must apparently be made by the agency.
Whether or not cases are referred by the federal agency itself or by
its collection agent, the power of compromising a claim or terminating
an action remains with the federal agency. 265 However, the statute does
not expressly forbid contractual provisions with attorneys granting them
some discretion on these matters, as for example, where the debt may be
relatively small in size.2 66 Otherwise the statute does not describe the
type or degree of supervision over the activities of outside counsel ex-
pected of the referring agency or the Justice Department. 267
c. Miscellaneous provisions
Contracts with attorneys for collection could justifiably contain vari-
ous other provisions to protect both the interests of the government and
the public. Some of those suggested during the legislative consideration
of the amendments include agreements holding the government harm-
less from claims made by debtors (or others) arising out of the efforts of
263 H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 5:
In the situation where the agency chose to use a debt collection service, and the service was
unable to collect the debt, the agency may then determine that private legal services are
needed. In such a case, the agency itself must select the law firm to handle the debt,
although the debt collection service may, pursuant to contract or agency direction, actually
transfer the file to the law firm selected by the agency. In the case of such a decision, the
debt collection service must return the entire file on the debt to the agency or transfer it at
the agency's direction to the selected law firm.
264 S. Dept Report, supra note 209, at 9:
In order to facilitate referrals, a federal agency may send its cases directly to private
counsel that has been retained by the Department ofJustice to handle such a case or class of
cases. When claims of indebtedness are pending with a private collection agency under a
contractual agreement, the federal agency head may direct those cases to be transferred
from the collection agency to the approved private counsel. Such direct transferal of the
case documentation and other information will facilitate timely litigation.
This legislation does not prohibit an executive or legislative agency from including in
its contract with a private collection agency a provision authorizing a collection agency to
transfer prior-approved claims of indebtedness to a private counsel which has been retained by
the Department ofJustice to take legal action on the particular case or class of cases.
(emphasis added).
The emphasized portion of the Senate Report could be construed to suggest that an agency may
give advance approval referrals, leaving it up to the collection agency to decide whether and when to
refer. Since the House Bill was enacted in lieu of the Senate Bill and the House Report (Sept. 27,
1986) was issued and available to the Senate at the time of the Senate's final action (Oct. 8, 1986), it
can be argued that any difference between the two Reports should be resolved in favor of the House
view. In fact the Senate "debate," when the House version was before it, seemed to accept the
House approach. See 143 CONG. REc. S15616 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Sen. D'Amato)
(collection agency "to transfer all the documents related to the claim to private counsel retained by
the Attorney General to whom claims have been referred by the Federal agency should legal services
be required").
265 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(5)(B).
266 See H. Debt Report, supra note 211, at 15 (letter of Acting Comptroller General).
267 But see supra text at notes 245-46.
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private counsel to collect debts268 and/or requiring that counsel have in-
surance to protect the government from such claims. 269 '
Provisions permitting periodic auditing of the accounts of retained
attorneys,270 for segregated trust funds to hold government moneys,
271
and prompt remittance of collections to the federal agency 272 have been
used in other contexts and seem equally applicable on the federal level.
While the Debt Collection Amendments expressly make counsel subject
to various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,273 a con-
tractual provision highlighting this fact along with the potential applica-
bility of other federal and state laws relating to debt collection would
seem particularly appropriate. 274 Similarly, failure to comply with appli-
cable standards of professional responsibility and conflict of interest reg-
ulations and prohibitions 275 could be specifically referred to as a basis for
contract termination. Finally, contract termination could be expressly
authorized in the case where the contractor fails satisfactorily to pursue
one or more claims where the contractor has been assigned responsibil-
ity for a 'whole class of debts.276
3. Selection Process
The legislative history clearly demonstrates that competition was to
characterize the process of selection of attorneys for debt collection.
277
The requirement that the Attorney General use his "best efforts" to ob-
tain "at least four such contracts for legal services with private individu-
als or firms" in each judicial district chosen for the pilot program was
seen to be related in some way to ensuring competition. 278 More signifi-
cantly, the statute as finally enacted expressly provides that nothing in it
"shall relieve the Attorney General of the competition requirements set
forth in title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949 (41 U.S.C. § 251 and following)". 2 79 This provision evidences
the assumption that the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984280 ap-
plies to the procurement of the services of private attorneys generally
and, in particular, the services of debt collection lawyers hired by Justice
under this program. While some of the exemptions from "full and open
competition" 281 might conceivably apply to some instances of retention
268 See 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 32.
269 Id. at 81.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 88.
272 Id. at 81.
273 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1982). See Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305,
3306 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. II 1984)) (adding a new subsection
3718(b)(6)).
274 Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3718(a)(1)(B) (1982).
275 See infra note 447 and accompanying text.
276 See 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 81 (which lists other conditions imposed by New
York).
277 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 8; H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 4-5.
278 Id.
279 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. §3718 (Supp. I 1984)) (adding a new subsection 3718(b)(1)(A)).
280 See supra notes 131-84 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 253(c) (Supp. III 1986).
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of debt collection counsel, 282 Congress seems to have assumed that gen-
erally the statutorily compelled competition procedures would be fol-
lowed in the implementation of this program.283 The legislative history
in the House is particularly emphatic on this point.2 4 Since the assump-
tion seems to have been that contracts awarded would not apply simply
to one claim but many,285 the expense, including the delay, introduced
by competitive procedures was presumably viewed as justifiable given the
potential benefits; this is, after all, only a pilot program. Some of the
states which have used private attorneys for debt collection have es-
chewed competitive bidding, though New York has not and believes it
has saved considerably in opting for that type of procurement process. 28 6
While the statute focuses to some substantial extent on the type and
magnitude of fee charged for collection services, it is clear that Con-
gress 2 8 7 did not believe that price alone should determine the selection
of an attorney for a contract. Thus, sealed bids are not required.288 Ac-
cordingly while the Debt Collection Amendments do not lay down in de-
tail the considerations deemed relevant to the selection of contractors, it
was apparently expected that the Justice Department would consider,
along with proposed fee arrangements, the "experience, skills, reputa-
tion and resources of the competing contractors." 28 9
In addition to the foregoing considerations, the Debt Collection
Amendments direct the Attorney General to "use his best efforts to enter
into contracts . . .with law firms owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals." 290 Widespread advertising of
the opportunity to compete for these contracts was seen as one way to
ensure that such firms have an adequate opportunity to compete.
29'
Moreover, if such contracts are entered into, each agency must "use its
best efforts to assure that not less than 10 percent of the amounts of all
282 See supra notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
283 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 8; H. Debt Report, supra note 212, at 5.
284 See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 243, at 64-69.
285 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 7.
286 See 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 35-41.
287 The House Report noted that "[o]f course, these competition requirements do not mandate
that the Attorney General always select the low bidder; he may consider such factors as experience in
the field and previous performance in collecting debts in selecting firms for contracts." H. Debt
Report, supra note 212, at 5. Similarly, the Senate Report indicated that "the most important consid-
eration in debt collection contracting should not be the contingency fee percentage, but rather, the
net amount of dollars returned to the Government." S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 7.
288 See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(2) (1982).
289 See S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 7. Specifically the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs expects that:
the Department will retain firms with debt collection experience, a trained collections staff,
and the capability to handle a large volume of cases, which may require automated litigation
support. The reputation of the law firm for responsible practices in the collection of con-
sumer and commercial debts must also be considered. Attorneys selected should meet the
highest ethical standards and be members in good standing in the state bar. The Commit-
tee would expect the Department to contact the American Bar Association, the Commercial
Law League, and state and local bar associations, as well as creditors who have used law
firms, to determine their reliability, recovery rates, and performance.
Id.
290 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding subsection 3718(b)(l)(B)).
291 S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 8.
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claims referred to private counsel by that agency are referred to law firms
owned or controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals." 2
92
The administration-supported bill proposed that judicial review of
the procurement decisions of the Justice Department under this program
be expressly precluded. 293 Such a provision does not appear in the final
version and in fact the Senate Report expressly contemplates that such
review would be available with Justice Department "criteria and guide-
lines for selection" to guide the reviewing court.294
4. Program Reports
The Attorney General is required by the statute to annually report to
Congress on the activities of the Department ofJustice to recover indebt-
edness owed the United States, including not only its own litigation but
that conducted by private counsel retained under the pilot program.295
Moreover at the conclusion of the three year life-span of the program,
the Comptroller General is required to conduct an audit of the actions of
the Department of Justice under the statute, including the extent of the
competition among private counsel to obtain contracts awarded, the rea-
sonableness of the fees provided in those contracts, the efforts to retain
the services of law firms owned and controlled by socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals, and the results of private debt collection
efforts.296
5. The Justice Department's Implementing Regulations
Implementing regulations required by the Debt Collection Act were
adopted by the Department ofJustice onJune 18, 1987297 with an effec-
tive date of August 31, 1987. While the Department anticipates that
eventually additional rules regarding private debt collection may be
adopted,298 this initial set does very little to elaborate on the content of
the program.
The Assistant Attorney General for Administration is delegated the
authority to "develop and administer" the pilot program, including the
establishment of policies and procedures and entering into contracts
292 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding subsection 3718(b)(3)).
In his signing statement accompanying the bill, the President noted his understanding that such
"objectives will be pursued in a race-neutral manner with respect to the actual award of contracts,
and that the criteria for identifying socially and economically disadvantaged contractors will not
contain preferences or presumptions based on race or ethnicity." 22 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1464 (Nov. 3, 1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5619. The President also
observed that "[i]mplementation of these provisions in any other manner would be of doubtful con-
stitutional validity because the goal is not premised on findings of actual discrimination in the grant-
ing of contracts." Id.
293 See, e.g., 1986 Sen. Hearings, supra note 214, at 30-31.
294 S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 8.
295 Act of Oct. 28, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-578, § 1(4), 100 Stat. 3305, 3306 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3718 (Supp. 11 1984)) (adding subsection 3718(c)).
296 Id. § 6 at 3306-07.
297 See 52 F.R. 24448 (July 1, 1987).
298 Id.
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with private attorneys. 299 Subdelegation of this authority is provided
for.30 0 However the sole responsibility for designating the pilot districts
apparently lies with this Assistant Attorney General.
30 1
United States Attorneys in the pilot districts must direct "the full
cooperation and assistance of their respective offices in implementing the
program."302 An Assistant United States Attorney in each district will be
"responsible for assisting the contracting officer by supervising the work
of the private counsel in their respective districts and providing necessary
approvals with respect to the initiation or settlement of lawsuits or simi-
lar matters."30
3
The reference to "supervision" raises the specter of personal service
contracting and the issues implicated thereby.30 4 This part of the regula-
tion obviously reflects the constitutional and policy concerns regarding
the vesting of litigation authority outside the government which have be-
deviled the Department from the outset.30 5 At the same time the regula-
tions do not indicate when "approvals" of initiation and settlement of
suits are "necessary" or whether the "approvals" referred to are those of
the Department of Justice or the agency with a claim against the debtor.
In short, the manner in which control over the efforts Of private counsel
will be exercised is not clarified to any substantial degree by the
regulations.
Finally, the regulations note that contracts for legal services for debt
collection will be awarded "in accordance with competitive procurement
procedures mandated by Federal law . . "306 They also indicate in a
general way the manner in which participation in the debt collection pro-
gram by law firms owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals will be encouraged.
30 7
6. Program Administration
Five judicial districts have been selected for participation in the pilot
program - Los Angeles, Miami, Detroit, Houston, and Brooklyn, New
York - and an additional five districts will be selected later. The Depart-
ment of Justice estimated that the number of commercial and consumer
debts that may be initially referred to private counsel totalled, at a mini-
mum, 1,115 (amounting to $4,864,900) in Los Angeles; 898 (amounting
to $4,021,600) in Miami; 1,412 (amounting to $4,939,900) in Detroit;
2,685 (amounting to $7,185,700) in Brooklyn, New York; and 8,655
(amounting to $24,980,400) in Houston.
Much of the detailed framework for the debt collection program is
contained in the request for proposals (RFP) which was issued by the
299 28 C.F.R. § 1i.1 (1988).
300 Id.
301 Id. at § 11.2.
302 Id.
303 Id. (emphasis added).
304 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 56 and 246 and accompanying text.




Department on October 19, 1987. In response to that, interested private
attorneys and law firms were required to submit both business manage-
ment and technical proposals to be evaluated under competitive proce-
dures. Over 1,000 lawyers and law firms in the five pilot districts had
previously written the Justice Department asking for the RFP when is-
sued.30 8 Eighty-five law firms and lawyers submitted proposals in re-
sponse to the RFP. As of February 1, 1988, however, no contracts had
been awarded in any pilot district, though awards in at least one were
expected in the near future.
Under the RFP the Department retains the right to select cases for
referral directly to U.S. Attorneys based on criteria of its own choosing.
Federal agencies with outstanding debts will send cases to a Central In-
take Facility (CIF) operated by a vendor (not a private attorney) which
will be selected by a separate procurement. U.S. Attorneys will also send
cases which they want placed with a contractor to this CIF. The CIF will
evaluate each case file and enter relevant information in a central com-
puter database. After this initial screening at the CIF, the case files will
be forwarded either to U.S. Attorneys or to legal services contractors.
The RFP emphasizes that all collection, litigation, and enforcement
efforts by the contractor must be in compliance with applicable federal,
state, and local law and governing ethical standards, including the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (1983).
Any violation of these will be considered a sufficient cause for termina-
tion of the contract. All collection, litigation,,and judgment enforcement
services furnished by a contractor will be under the direction of the Con-
tracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR), who will be an As-
sistant United States Attorney in each judicial district chosen for the pilot
program.
For present purposes some of the most important aspects of the RFP
are those provisions which detail the degree of control to be exercised by
the Department over the performance of each contractor in its collection
efforts. First of all, the contractor will be required to sue the debtor im-
mediately if he or she does not pay the entire outstanding balance within
thirty days of the contractor's initial contact, with the debtor or does not
agree to an installment repayment plan. The choice of forum for the
litigation will be left to the contractor's professional judgment unless the
amount of indebtedness exceeds $10,000, in which case suit must be
brought in a federal district court. Where the contractor intends to use
form letters or pleadings, it will have to obtain advance approval from
the COTR. But, once that approval is obtained, letters and pleadings, if
in the approved form, can be sent in all cases. Otherwise, if a debtor
answers a complaint or contests the debt in any way, the contractor will
provide the COTR with a copy of any motions or pleadings that the con-
tractor intends to file in response before they are filed. Moreover, the
contractor will furnish the COTR with copies of any and all pleadings
and motions which it subsequently files after the COTR's approval.
308 Letter from Robert N. Ford, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to author (Oct. 20, 1987).
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A contractor will be required to request a judgment for all principal,
interest, penalties, costs, and attorneys fees to the extent permitted by
the debt instrument or applicable law. Where a debtor acknowledges the
debt and wants to enter into an installment repayment plan, the contrac-
tor must insist that the debtor execute a consent judgment and, if full
payment is not received within thirty days, the executed judgment must
be entered with the court even if a repayment plan is agreed to. Repay-
ment plans must result in repayment of the outstanding amounts due
within the shortest time practicable based on the financial resources of
the debtor. In all cases, satisfaction of the amount due must occur within
three years. Otherwise, the contractor is entitled to use its professional
judgment in arriving at a repayment schedule, though the minimal
monthly amount may not be less than $50 unless the COTR approves.
Compromises of any amount due from the debtor require prior written
authorization from the COTR, who has the right to direct the terms and
conditions of the settlement for any debt.
Whenever a defendant debtor raises a significant question of law or
another issue which could result in an adverse precedent or have an im-
pact on the Department of Justice's rights or its collection efforts, the
contractor must immediately notify the COTR prior to making any writ-
ten or oral argument on the issue. Moreover, the contractor must mail to
the COTR a copy of any pleading or motion filed by the debtor which
raises a counterclaim or affirmative defense. The COTR will decide how
to proceed in these cases and has the discretion to withdraw the case
from the contractor when this is deemed appropriate. Where the de-
fendant appeals a judgment or order obtained by the contractor, the
COTR must similarly be informed and that officer will decide how to
proceed with the case, including possible recall of the case from the con-
tractor. In fact, the Department retains the right to require the contrac-
tor at any time to return a case for any reason including, but not limited
to, those instances when in the COTR's judgment the case is not being
handled satisfactorily.
Each contractor must report to the COTR any change in the status
of a case as it occurs and, in addition, must file a monthly activity report.
That report must include, for the reporting period, the number of com-
plaints filed, the number of judgments entered, the number of new re-
payment plans, the number of cases paid in full, and the number of cases
received, pending, and returned, as well as a brief narrative of the signifi-
cant events, accomplishments, and problems associated with contract
performance. Reporting requirements do not appear nearly as detailed
as those mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
described below.30
9
Overall, the Department ofJustice's Request for Proposals suggests
that contractors will be kept on a reasonably short leash in dealing with
debtors. In view of the fact that these contractors will not be enforcing
the criminal statutes of the United States or other regulatory enactments
and in view of the degree of control that apparently will be exercised, it is
309 See infra note 379 and accompanying text.
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unlikely that a constitutional challenge to the debt collection scheme will
be successful.310 Whether the degree of control is sufficient to avoid
characterization of the contractual relationship as a personal services
contract is somewhat more questionable.31 '
C. Concluding General Observations
In enacting the Debt Collection Amendments of 1986, Congress ad-
ded to those comparatively rare instances where it has expressly author-
ized the use of private attorneys for litigation purposes. The limited
nature of this program in terms of both its temporal and geographical
scope along with the extensive reporting and auditing requirements evi-
dence congressional awareness of the potential risks, at least in the area
of debt collection, which are posed to both governmental and private
interests by widespread reliance on outside litigation counsel. The con-
trols on the activities of the attorneys hired which are mandated by the
statute or imposed by agency regulation, contract, and practice will
hopefully mitigate these problems and moot any potential constitutional
challenge. 31 2 At the same time, however, the degree of control provided
may subject these attorneys to some regulation by OPM313 and, as we
shall see, bring them within the coverage of the federal conflict of inter-
est statutes. 314
The legislative history of the Amendments indicates Congressional
awareness that in the area of legal services contracting, an agency may,
and perhaps should in most cases, be guided not merely by the lowest
price available but by other less easily quantifiable considerations. At the
same time, Congress has made it dear that competitive procurement of
services should be the rule and not the exception even with regard to
attorneys.
Finally, the program established by the Amendments in effect repre-
sents a congressional judgment that it may in some instances be more
cost effective to use private counsel than government lawyers.3 15 One of
the alternatives in 1986 was to appropriate additional funds to expand
the staffs of the various United States Attorneys offices sufficiently to
handle the debt collection effort entirely in-house, an approach that ap-
parently even the Department of Justice did not seriously advocate. Be-
cause of various factors, including the expertise of collection attorneys,
the choice was made that "privatization" should be seriously pursued, if
only on a trial basis.
IV. Agency Use of Outside Counsel: A Survey
This survey of agency use of outside counsel to perform legal serv-
ices is based on a variety of sources. First of all, several years ago, pursu-
310 See supra notes 7-14, 2 45-46 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 45-84 and accompanying text.
312 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
314 See infra note 447 and accompanying text.
315 See, e.g., S. Debt Report, supra note 209, at 19.
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ant to the Freedom of Information Act,3 16 The National Law Journal filed
requests with various agencies for documentation related to this issue.
The materials which were furnished in response to these requests were
examined for this study, though they were somewhat dated at the time
this article was prepared. In order to obtain more complete and current
information, in early 1987 the Administrative Conference directed a
questionnaire 317 to several agencies, including the Departments of
Transportation, Interior, Housing and Urban Development, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, and the Veterans Administration. The re-
sponses to this were analyzed. Finally, various interviews were
conducted with agency officials 3 18 as well as attorneys319 who have
worked under contract with the government. The results of this survey
follow.
In view of the fact that currently the largest consumers of private
attorney services among federal agencies are the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) and that more detailed information was available
regarding their practices than those of other agencies, the following de-
scriptions of their use of private attorneys are relatively elaborate. While
the situation confronting other agencies may be unique in one or more
316 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
317 Administrative Conference of the United States
Administrative Survey of Government Use of Private Attorneys
Agency/Department:
Hiring or contracting office: General Counsel or Solicitor
Other agency office (specify)
(If hiring or contracting was by an office other than the agency's legal office, please indicate below
what role, if any, the agency's legal office has in the decision to seek outside counsel or to use the
particular attorney.)
Name of attorney or firm
Location
Relationship of attorney with agency: Contractor
Subcontractor
Special Government Employee Other (specify)
Period covered by contract or employment
Fee paid per hour $ Total number of hours worked
Was the fee less than the normal rate in that location?
Was the fee less than the normal rate for that attorney or firm?
(If yes to either question, please explain below.)
What was the statutory authority for hiring or contracting with the attorney?
Why did the agency choose to use an outside attorney?
Did the agency follow the provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act?
How were competitive bids sought? (If exempt from the Act, please explain.)
How did the agency determine that the attorney had no conflict of interest?
General description of work to be performed:
Remarks:
318 The author interviewed officials of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, among other agencies. The law firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, the prior consultant on this study of federal agency use of private attorneys, conducted other
interviews of officials, the findings of which are referenced, where appropriate, in the footnotes to
Appendix A to this article (though the specific interviewee is not named in this article, only a refer-
ence to the relevant page of the Wolf Block Report is given [hereinafter Wolf Block Report]). In
addition, ACUS held a public hearing [hereinafter ACUS Hearing] on May 26, 1986 at which various
officials testified. Where information from that hearing is relied upon, the footnotes to Appendix A
so indicate.
319 The prior consultant, Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, conducted these interviews, the
substance of which is contained in its draft report.
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ways, the experience of the FDIC and the FSLIC may be a source of gui-
dance for them where appropriate.
The time constraints applicable to the preparation of this article pre-
cluded an in-depth examination of the practices of these other agencies.
Moreover it appears that record-keeping with regard to the use of
outside counsel is not always provided for in such a manner that it is
relatively easy to identify the exact scope and nature of all legal work
which has been contracted out. Available statistics on non-banking agen-
cies is, therefore, somewhat sketchy Nevertheless the existing data con-
veys a general sense of the scope of use of outside counsel throughout
the federal government. In addition that data provides other significant
insights into agency practices with regard to retaining private attorneys.
Accordingly, following the discussion of the FDIC and the FSLIC, a gen-
eral overview of the. situation in the rest of the government is provided
along with Appendices A, A-i, and A-2, which summarize the informa-
tion available with regard to specific agencies.'
A. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1. Background
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation functions in two distinct
capacities: (1) the insurer of deposits and the primary federal regulator
of state-chartered banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve
System; and (2) the receiver or liquidator of insured banks that have
failed.3 20 From its origin in 1933, the FDIC has retained private attor-
neys in connection with the liquidation of assets acquired from closed,
insured banks. 321 By statute the Corporation has the authority "[t]o
make contracts," "[t]o sue and be sued . .. " "[t]o act as receiver," "[t]o
prescribe . . .rules and regulations . . ." and "[t]o exercise . . . such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry out the powers so
granted."3 22 These are the provisions apparently relied upon as a basis
for the retention of private attorneys for litigation and other purposes. 323
In fact in one unreported opinion, a challenge to the authority of the
FDIC to use private attorneys to collect debts was rejected on the basis of
this statute.3 24
In recent years almost all of the legal services for the FDIC by
outside counsel have been performed in connection with failed banks
and the FDIC's receivership and liquidation activities and in connection
with assistance transactions involving failing or potentially failing
320 Memorandum to Honorable Doug BarnardJr., Chairman, Commerce, Consumer and Mone-
tary Affairs Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives
(March 15, 1985) (hereinafter Barnard Memorandum] at 1.
321 Interview with Thomas A. Rose, Deputy General Counsel and Carroll R. Shifflett, Assistant
General Counsel, FDIC (March 12, 1987) and materials supplied to Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (June 1988)
[hereinafter FDIC Interview].
322 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1982).
323 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
324 FDIC v. Barrasso, Case No. 82-725-Civ.-T-GC (U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla., Tampa Div., March
22, 1983) (relying on the power of the Board of Directors to prescribe rules and regulations).
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banks.3 25 As of December 31, 1987, there were 22,719 cases in litigation
(including bankruptcy cases), 11,737 of which were being handled in-
house by the Corporation's employees. Contract attorneys were in
charge of 10,287 cases and another 695 were considered "joint", that is
inside and outside counsel formed a "team" for their management.3 26
On a percentage basis, in 1987 more litigation was being handled by
FDIC employees than at any time in the agency's history.327 In terms of
expenditures for legal fees related to receivership and liquidation activi-
ties, the Corporation paid $7,586,957; $9,368,412; $21,341,407;
$26,603,645; $36,019,337; $43,307,249; and $52,547,054 in the fiscal
years 1981-1987 respectively. The agency estimated an expenditure of
$52,408,000 in outside counsel fees in the 1988 fiscal year.
3 28
In the FDIC's status as receiver or liquidator, outside counsel en-
gage in a variety of types of legal work: loan restructurings, collection
suits, foreclosure actions, bankruptcy matters, claims based on bankers'
blanket bonds, and defensive litigation usually involving claims against a
failed bank which the FDIC, as receiver or liquidator, is obligated to de-
fend. The Corporation has also engaged outside counsel on legal mat-
ters relating to potentially failing banks and in connection with open-
bank assistance transactions, such as FDIC-assisted mergers and the
Continental Illinois assistance transaction.3 29 The most common reason
for seeking outside assistance is not the need for special expertise,
though that may be a factor in some cases, but rather the lack of man-
power in the agency to handle all legal matters in which the FDIC be-
comes involved. 3
30
In order to increase its capacity to handle matters in-house, the Cor-
poration has dramatically increased its lawyer-employees from approxi-
mately 40 in 1982 to 371 nationwide in December 1987.331 The Legal
Division was reorganized in 1984 as part of an overall decentralization of
the FDIC's operations.332 In May 1987, seventy-nine full-time attorneys
worked at the Corporation's Washington office, thirty-four of whom
dealt with legal problems associated with the FDIC's liquidation and re-
ceivership functions. The Regional and Corporate Affairs Branch is re-
sponsible for legal services provided in the agency's six regional offices
to support both supervisory and liquidation activities.333 In mid-1987
seventy-eight full-time attorneys staffed the regional offices, sixty of
whom handled liquidation matters. Some of the FDIC's newly hired law-
yers were employed under special hiring authority providing for one year
325 Barnard Memorandum, supra note 320, at 1.
326 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
327 Id.
328 Id. The figures do not include fees related to the Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Co. of Chicago and the First National Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City.
329 Barnard Memorandum, supra note 320, at 6-7. In most instances the legal fees and expenses
of outside counsel are paid by the institution receiving FDIC assistance.
330 FDIC Interview, supra note 321. See also Barnard Memorandum, supra note 320, at 7 ("volume
of bank failures is probably the most dominant" reason for going outside).
331 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.




renewable appointments. In the spring of 1987 one hundred and fifty-six
of these were so-called "liquidation-graded" attorneys. These lawyers
work at field site offices. This type of hiring authority permitted the Cor-
poration to meet its short and intermediate term needs without taking on
the burden of additional permanent staff.A
3 4
Since the predominant use of outside counsel is in the area of the
FDIC's capacity as receiver or liquidator, it is important to note how the
fees for these services are paid. Expenses from collection efforts (includ-
ing allocable FDIC personnel costs for its lawyer-employees) are paid
from the proceeds of the collections or absorbed by the Permanent In-
surance Fund created by assessments on the deposits of insured
banks.335 Appropriated funds are not involved.336 Moreover, since the
proceeds of collections and other actions benefit private parties and not
the United States Treasury, the Department ofJustice has suggested that
it would be inappropriate for the United States itself to pay for the serv-
ices through representation by the Department.33 7
2. Written Guidance
The FDIC has rather elaborate written guidance applicable to the
hiring of outside counsel. For example, the purely internal directives set
forth criteria for the selection and termination of outside counsel,338 con-
siderations to be observed in negotiation of the fee,339 questions to'be
kept in mind in reviewing a fee bill,3 40 and general directions regarding
how to handle problems arising in the relationship between the FDIC
and the outside counsel. Some of these documents, such as the criteria
for choosing an attorney, are similar to those found in the corporate
area.34 ' Others, such as the fee bill checklist, had no counterparts-at
least in the degree of detail and insight-among the corporate materials
examined as part of this study. While some of these documents may ap-
pear to state the obvious (again the criteria for choice document is, to an
extent, an example of this), the guidance is a training tool for new em-
ployees and may help to "jog the memory in appropriate cases.
'3 42
334 Id.
335 Id. at 3-4.
336 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
337 Barnard Memorandum, supra note 320, at 4.
338 These include the repute of the attorney or firm in the legal profession and in the locality
served; the experience of the attorney or firm in the type of legal work required or expected; the
ability of the attorney or firm to handle the anticipated volume of work; the geographic location of
the attorney or firm; whether the fee rates are reasonable; whether the attorney or firm can make
available an adequate number of attorneys to handle related matters of a routine or less important
nature and at a lower fee rate; possible conflicts of interest; the degree of cooperation expected; the
responsiveness to the FDIC's needs to be kept informed; and whether the FDIC is a major client of
the firm.
339 These include the volume of work directed at the firm and the treatment of various expenses
such as LEXIS, typing, filing and secretarial overtime.
340 For example, has FDIC been credited for the "learning curve" when the firm shifts attorneys
for its own purposes; was there excessive senior attorney review or excessive paralegal time; did
some attorneys regularly bill 6-8 hours a day; are there excessive reviews of file or status reports; are
continuances on behalf of FDIC requested because the firm is not ready?
341 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
342 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
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Aside from internal policies, the FDIC has in the past incorporated
its restrictions and expectations with regard to the activity of outside
counsel in connection with bank liquidation matters in an elaborate em-
ployment of counsel letter which was in 1987 replaced in large degree by
a "Guide for Legal Representation" to be distributed to all attorneys,
both full- and part-time employees and outside counsel.343 For clarity of
presentation most of the matters covered in these documents are dis-
cussed separately below. It should be noted here, however, that the
"Guide" stresses the FDIC's desire to obtain "quality legal representa-
tion in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner. ' 344 The outside at-
torney is also reminded that the Corporation "places great importance
on the professional skills and conduct of all attorneys representing" it
and that its status as a public instrumentality "mandates that our attor-
neys, whether inside or outside, demonstrate the highest standards of
ethics, professionalism, and competence."
345
3. Procurement Procedures
Apparently the FDIC is not subject to the civil service regime as a
matter of law but has brought itself under its strictures as a matter of
policy. 34 6 Among other things, this would appear to mean that the dis-
tinction between "personal" and "non-personal" services contracts
which has such significance for other governmental entities in their pro-
curement of services has, 347 at the least, diminished significance in the
case of this corporation. Neither the internal directives nor the employ-
ment-related documents supplied outside counsel make a point of identi-
fying the attorney as an "independent contractor." All this means that
the FDIC can legally exercise substantial supervision over the efforts of
outside counsel without undue concern for unwittingly bringing the con-
tractual relationship within the restrictions applicable to personal service
contracting. As will be seen, in fact the FDIC often exerts such close
control.34
8
As a "mixed ownership" corporation, the FDIC is not subject to the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.349 This does not mean, how-
ever, that the agency does not attempt to conduct its procurement in a
manner which may achieve much the same purposes as that legislation.
When time and circumstances permit, and the attorney to be retained has
not been previously used by the agency, three or four firms are identified
and contacted in order to determine their interest in representing the
agency. Representatives of the firms are interviewed 350 with regard to
their fees and other matters including those covered by the "criteria"
343 Id.
344 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION GUIDE FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION [hereinafter
FDIC Guide] 1.
345 Id. at 2.
346 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
347 See supra notes 45-84 and accompanying text.
348 See infra notes 356-79 and accompanying text.
349 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. See also Letter of Michael B. Burgee, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel, to Marshall J. Breger, ACUS Chairman (Nov. 10, 1986).
350 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
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document.351 Evaluation of the responses may narrow the field to one or
two. Then those lawyers who will actually perform the work are inter-
viewed.3 52 This process is also employed when the agency has not been
dissatisfied with a firm it has used in the past but merely wishes to insure
that it is getting the best services for the best price.
353
Given the immediate need for counsel in cases of unexpected bank
failures,35 4 as well as the desire to avoid advance publicity of potential
failures and the inevitable public reaction, full and open competition
within the meaning of the CICA may simply not be feasible for the FDIC
in many instances.3 55
4. Case Management, Supervision and Control
It is the policy of the FDIC "that attorneys in its Legal Division
should always be responsible for managing any legal assignment or liti-
gation, even though a matter has been referred to outside counsel."
35 6
Therefore, an FDIC attorney's approval is required for "all major strate-
gic or tactical decisions,"35 7 at least where a case involves important is-
sues or large sums. 35 8 The degree of FDIC involvement in a case varies
in practice from instances where a "joint" approach is taken and substan-
tial control resides in the Corporation to "routine" matters requiring rel-
atively little overall supervision.359 The degree of involvement may vary
depending on the extent of experience with and trust in the attorney or
firm retained.36
0
At the outset of a referral of a case, the FDIC attorney assigned the
matter develops with the outside counsel a "case plan"3 61 which covers,
inter alia, anticipated discovery, the issues requiring research, and a
strategy of achieving a negotiated settlement.3 62 In addition counsel is
asked for an initial assessment of the likely outcome of litigation, time
required to conclude the matter and fees and expenses to be incurred.3 63
A litigation budget may be drafted. 36 Compliance with the case plan
and budget, as initially agreed upon or later modified, is monitored
closely as a cost control technique.3 65 Particularly at the beginning of the
relationship with outside counsel, pleadings and other filings may be re-
viewed by the FDIC attorney in charge prior to filing.3 66 Correspon-
351 See supra note 338.
352 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
353 Id. The agency maintains a "List of Counsel Utilitzed" and has adopted written procedures
detailing when and how counsel not on the list can be retained.
354 Id.
355 See also infra notes 417-18 and accompanying text.
356 FDIC Guide, supra note 344, at 3.
357 Id. at 3.
358 Id. at 3. See also FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
359 FDIC Guide, supra note 344, at 3. See also FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
360 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
361 FDIC Guide, supra note 344, at 3.
362 See id. at 12.
363 See id at 13.
364 See id at 13-14.
365 Id at 4, 13.
366 See id at 15.
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dence and other documentation, whether from retained or opposing
counsel, are also forwarded to the FDIC.
3 67
Retained attorneys are given a variety of instructions regarding their
conduct of the case in the written guidance documents supplied by the
FDIC. Specifically, outside counsel are advised to avoid multiple repre-
sentation of the firm at meetings or depositions, rotating lawyers knowl-
edgeable about FDIC matters and using FDIC work to train
personnel. 368 To avoid costly duplication of research efforts, the FDIC
has a "brief bank" which contains the results of all major research
projects. 369 These documents are made available to outside counsel,
who are, accordingly, cautioned not to embark on a significant research
project until it has been determined whether the materials in the brief
bank contain relevant information. 370 There are certain legal issues of
special interest to the Corporation because of, for example, the need for
a nationwide approach. Counsel are directed to contact FDIC staff
before researching or drafting on these issues.3 71 Relevant research or
statements of agency policy may be provided to counsel or the FDIC may
take over the part of the case raising issues of particular interest to the
Corporation.3 72 In areas of the country where the FDIC has an office, as
a cost control mechanism 3 73 or for other reasons,3 74 the Corporation's
legal staff may take over discovery or other projects.
In addition, retained counsel are advised regarding various aspects
of FDIC's litigation and settlement philosophy and procedures. Specifi-
cally, attorneys are told that the Corporation does not want to take ex-
treme positions unlikely to have a substantive impact on litigation and
that coercive, delaying or obstructive tactics should be avoided.3 75
Where possible, cases should be settled at a very early stage.3 76 All set-
tlement offers must be immediately reported to the FDIC attorney in
charge. 377 Finally, counsel is directed to be alert to opportunities for
using non-judicial dispute resolution approaches.
3 78
Upon the filing of the complaint or answer, the outside counsel must
submit a "commencement of action" report which includes the docket
number, claim amount, the statute of limitations date, and the date the
complaint was filed, among other things. Along with fee bills, counsel
must quarterly file written "status reports" which include the next hear-
ing date, the current estimated cost of litigation, the current success ra-
tio, current estimated time of completion, cumulative fees and expenses,
and estimate of judgment size and collectibility.379
367 See id. at 15.




372 Id. at 6-7.
373 Id. at 7.
374 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
375 FDIC Guide, supra note 344, at 8.
376 Id. at 8.
377 Id. at 8-9.
378 Id. at 9.




Since the FDIC wants to "maximize recovery and minimize the ex-
pense," it does not always require that a fee be based on an hourly rate
or a contingency. Rather, a variety of fee arrangements are possible.
The Corporation wants to retain its ability to choose the option that is
best in the circumstances. 3 0 Often firms give the FDIC a discount from
their normal rates. 38 ' It is the total cost of legal services and the results
achieved that is generally viewed as more important than the mere rate of
compensation. 382 In 1987 the average hourly rate paid by the FDIC to
outside counsel was $86.92.
Apparently the Corporation makes it clear to retained counsel that a
case should be handled by the member of a firm who is both capable of
an adequate job and yet billed at the lowest rate.383 Fee bills are to be
submitted on a quarterly basis and are to include the date(s) of service,
name(s) of the individual service provider(s), description(s) of service(s),
time(s) billed for service, hourly rates, expenses billed, and total hours
and expenses billed on the case.3 84 The agency has an internal written
procedure specifying the levels of authority at which fee bills of various
amounts have to be approved, setting forth auditing procedures, and list-
ing criteria for review of each bill.
6. Conflicts of Interest
Outside counsel are informed that the FDIC expects "the highest
ethical standards in [their] representation of the FDIC." 385 At the time
of his or her retention, the attorney (or firm) must provide the Corpora-
tion with a list of potentially conflicting representations. Thereafter, any
potential conflict must be discussed with the FDIC as soon as its exist-
ence is recognized. The Corporation retains the right to determine
whether an actual or potential conflict exists.38 6 The conflicts referred to
include those covered by the "Code of Professional Responsibility and
applicable federal or state provisions." 38 7 The Guide, therefore, does
not clearly answer the question whether (or when) retained attorneys are
subject to federal conflict of interest law contained in Title 18 of the
United States Code.3 88 It does not impose those standards regardless of
their applicability of their own force.
380 FDIC Interview, supra note 321.
381 Id.
382 Barnard Memorandum, supra note 320, at 11.
383 Id.
384 FDIC Guide, supra note 344, at 18.
385 Id. at 4.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 It would appear, however, that the conflict of interest provisions contained in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201-05 (1982) do apply to the FDIC. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) ("executive agency" means a
government corporation); 18 U.S.C. § 6 (1982) ("agency" includes government corporations); 18
U.S.C. § 205 (1982) (employees of "executive branch" and "agency"). Only "employees" are cov-
ered but, given the control exercised over at least some FDIC outside counsel, it is an open question
whether they are not also subject to Title 18. See infra notes 439-47 and accompanying text.
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The FDIC currently has an outside Counsel Conflicts Committee to
deal with conflicts issues as they arise and to help avoid their treatment
on a purely ad hoc, potentially inconsistent, basis. 389 It has been charged
with producing guidelines for future use.
7. Tracking and Evaluation of Outside Counsel Program
The initial and subsequent status reports, along with the quarterly
fee bills, provide information that is computer-accessible as part of the
FDIC's case management system. As such, it can support an elaborate
method of tracking both individual matters and the general flow of litiga-
tion for cost control and other purposes.
There is also an "outside counsel working group" made up of in-
house attorneys and an outside consultant to evaluate the use of private
attorneys by the FDIC and to suggest improvements in the general sys-
tem or even to offer advice on specific cases.390 The Guide itself was a
product of its efforts. 39 1 In addition, meetings are held involving agency
in-house attorneys both from Washington and the regions for training
and discussion purposes related to the retention of outside counsel.
3 92
The FDIC's experience with hiring outside counsel since 1933, and
particularly after the current rash of bank failures began in the early
1980's, appears to dwarf that of many (or most) private corporations.
That experience is clearly reflected in the elaborate memorialization of
procedures, policies, criteria and approaches. In fact the agency may
deem itself more "expert" in this area than most other entities, public or
private, and that those have much to learn from it. 39
The Corporation has not been free from criticism by its legal con-
tractors, though that criticism may not be repeated in the future in all
respects given recent changes evidenced by the production of the Guide
and higher staffing levels. In the past the following problems have been
identified by outside counsel: weak supervision, frequent turnover of
agency personnel requiring re-education regarding pending cases, delay
in paying bills, elaborate billing and reporting requirements, and lack of
coordination among supervisory groups.394 The FDIC has admitted that
such complaints have been leveled at it and that some problems may
have existed; though the Corporation may not see at least some of the
identified concerns as "problems" but necessary off-shoots of its need to
control costs and protect its interests.3 95





394 See Wolf Block Report, supra note 318, at 101-14.
395 See ACUS Hearing, supra note 318, at 113-14, 117-19 (testimony of Michael B. Burgee, Dep-
uty General Counsel, FDIC).
[Vol. 63:399
LEGAL SERVICES CONTRACTING
B. Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings And Loan
Insurance Corporation
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) is the operating head
of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The former is
organized in various offices including the Office of the FSLIC and the
Office of the General Counsel, the latter of which itself contains divisions
that provide in-house legal services to the FSLIC. The services of
outside counsel have, on rare occasions, been retained for operations of
the Board other than those regarding the statutory duties of the FSLIC.
At present, however, all of the legal work contracted out involves the
operations of the FSLIC.3 96 For statutory authority to hire attorneys, the
FSLIC relies in part on the power to "make contracts" and to "sue and
be sued."'3
97
It may be helpful at the outset to compare and contrast the situation
at the FSLIC with that at the FDIC. The FSLIC is now the largest con-
sumer of private legal services in the federal government based on avail-
able data. It paid outside counsel $22.8 million during the 1985 fiscal
year, $37.3 million in 1986 and $85.86 million in 1987.398 Approxi-
mately 40% of those amounts were spent on litigation and the remaining
60% were incurred for other legal services such as business counsel, in-
vestigations and insurance determinations. 399
The dominant rationale given for seeking outside assistance is differ-
ent for each agency. The FDIC explains its use of private attorneys
largely as a matter of lack of staff resources to handle the volume of legal
work, not the lack of "expertise." On the other hand, the FSLIC's con-
tracting is required not only because of a lack of staff resources, but by
the need for "expertise" with respect to issues of local law.40 0 In terms
of in-house legal resources, the FDIC, with over 370 attorneys staffing
both Washington, regional, and site offices, outdistances the Board with
approximately 200 who work in Washington.
40 1
Furthermore, written memorialization of the practices relating to
controlling outside counsel and the directions to them was, as of the
spring of 1988, more extensive at the FDIC.40 2 The FSLIC procedures
for selection and oversight of outside counsel are a combination of writ-
ten and unwritten policies and evolving agency practice.
In addition, apparently the degree of control exercised by the FDIC
over the conduct of litigation by outside counsel is significantly greater in
396 Interviews with Ronald Oberle, Associate General Counsel for Contracting and Procurement
Law, Office of General Counsel, FHLBB (March 12, 1987 and May 15, 1987) [hereinafter FHLBB
Interview].
397 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c) (1982). See also 5 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982).
398 Letter ofJordan Luke, General Counsel, FSLIC, to the Honorable Doug Barnard, Chairman,
Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Op-
erations (June 6, 1988).
399 Id.
400 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
401 Id.
402 During 1987 and 1988, the FSLIC prepared a more extensive written memorialization of its
practices than had existed previously.
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many or most instances than the control relied upon by the FSLIC. 40 3
While the FDIC is not by law subject to the civil service regime and,
therefore, less likely to concern itself with the legal issues presented by
the distinction between "personal" and "non-personal" services con-
tracts, 40 4 the Board and FSLIC 40 5 are under the jurisdiction of the OPM
and the civil service regime and in fact are very aware of the restrictions
applicable in the personal services area.40 6 The FSLIC's legal services
contracts specifically indicate that the services provided are non-per-
sonal, that no employer-employee relationships exist or will exist under
the contract, and that the contractor will not be subject to the supervi-
sion of federal employees. To the extent that the efforts of the FSLIC in
its receivership capacity impact most directly and immediately on private
interests and not public interests, 40 7 perhaps this degree of control is
justifiable, though apparently the FDIC does not so view its obligations
in dealing with its outside counsel in a somewhat similar context.
With regard to procurement procedures, legally speaking the FSLIC
and the FDIC find themselves in somewhat different situations. As a
mixed-ownership government corporation, the FDIC is not subject to the
Competition in Contracting Act.408 On the other hand, the FSLIC is a
wholly owned government corporation and subject to the Act with re-
spect to at least its insurance and supervisory functions, though perhaps
not when it acts as receiver or liquidator.40 9 Legal fees for the latter
functions at both the FDIC and the FSLIC are initially charged against
the estate of the failed bank or thrift institution. However, the insurance
fund that may absorb some of these charges is technically different, with
the FSLIC's considered appropriated and the FDIC's non-appropriated
funds.
4 10
Despite these differences, the procurement procedures followed by
both entities are not all that far apart in many cases. For one thing while
in the case of the FSLIC, it is subject to the CICA with regard to certain
of its functions, that statute contains an "urgency" exception41 1 which
might be invoked by the FSLIC to dispense with many of the more for-
mal competitive requirements of the CICA given the need to act quickly
on the failure of a thrift institution.41 2 In such circumstances the CICA
requires that the FSLIC "request offers from as many potential sources
as is practicable under the circumstances. ' 41 3 Even when acting as re-
ceiver or liquidator and arguably not subject to CICA, employees of the
403 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
404 See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
405 Except, perhaps, in its receivership capacity.
406 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
407 While the efforts of the FSLIC and the FDIC with regard to troubled institutions redound
directly to the benefit of private parties, ultimately there are large public interests at stake that justi-
fied in the first place Congressional authorization of the programs which these corporations now
administer.
408 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
409 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
410 Id.
411 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
412 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
413 41 U.S.C. § 253(e) (Supp. III 1985).
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FSLIC prior to retaining outside counsel for a particular matter are di-
rected to contact several firms to solicit their interest, discuss possible fee
arrangements, potential conflicts of interest, and other matters of con-
cern to the FSLIC. Enough firms must be contacted to identify at least
three firms without conflicts of interest, willing to propose to do the
work, and technically qualified to perform the services. Such firms are
compared "on technical and cost bases" and the proposal "most advan-
tageous to government, price and other factors considered" is recom-
mended for selection.4 14 As noted previously, such informal competitive
procedures are often found at the FDIC.4 15 As in the case of the FDIC,
widespread solicitation of proposals, which may be required by Title 41,
would create such problems for a potentially failing thrift institution and
other interested persons4 16 that as a practical matter a more flexible pro-
curement process is dictated in many instances. 41 7 One FHLBB official
interviewed indicated his emphatic view, however, that some form of
competition does save substantially in costs of legal services for the gov-
ernment where the decision has been made to contract out.418
Having surveyed these matters, much of the picture of the FSLIC as
a consumer of legal services has been drawn. Nevertheless certain addi-
tional information should be noted.
1. Written Documentation of Practices
The principle documents that currently exist relating to the FSLIC
retention and control of outside counsel include a Guide to the Forma-
tion and Administration of Legal Services Contracts, a checklist for nego-
tiating legal services contracts, a "contact" form memorializing
discussions with attorneys or firms contacted as part of the informal so-
licitation of proposals, an internal form memorandum requesting ap-
proval of the retention of a particular attorney or firm, a funding
document, the form contract with attachments, and Guidelines for the
Management and Control Over Outside Attorneys.
The Guide describes in general the method of source selection (in-
cluding issues to be discussed with firms contacted), internal agency pro-
cess for contract approval and matters related to contract administration
and negotiation. 419 A "checklist" 420 and "contact" form421 are prepared
for each firm contacted and list information that should be conveyed to
outsiders regarding FSLIC practices (such as its billing procedures) and
information to be collected from firms (such as firm expertise and hourly
rates charged). The memorandum "request for contract" 422 is prepared
for each contract proposed by agency staff for approval by the FSLIC's
414 FHLBB Guide to Formation and Administration of Legal Services Contracts.
415 See supra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
416 See supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
417 See also 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(7) (Supp. III 1985) (public interest exception to CICA but requir-
ing notification to Congress not less than 30 days before award of the contract).
418 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
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contracting officers and includes information such as how many firms
were contacted, the name of the firm recommended to provide the serv-
ices, projected billings, the reasons for the firm's selection, and the scope
of work to be done. The Guidelines include in part a list of the factors to
be taken into account (experience, capacity, geographic proximity, cost
and conflicts of interest) in selecting an attorney.
2. Types of Legal Services
Outside counsel perform the bulk of legal work required when the
FSLIC becomes involved with a troubled thrift institution. This may in-
clude litigation pending in favor of or against the institution, reorganiza-
tions, transfers of assets and other work related to the receivership. The
FSLIC may provide financial and other assistance directly to the problem
institution before failure or may seek to facilitate an acquisition of a trou-
bled thrift by providing such assistance. Contract lawyers may prepare
all documents for the proposed transaction and assist in negotiation of
the assistance agreement.
3. Contractual Undertakings by Outside Counsel and Oversight by
FSLIC
As noted previously, one of the principal documents relating to re-
tention of outside counsel is a form contract.423 It is intended to memo-
rialize various understandings between the FSLIC and the service
provider.
The contractor is advised that it is to provide the services in accord-
ance with directions given by the General Counsel's Office and under the
general direction of the General Counsel. The contractor is also told to
promptly advise the FSLIC regarding any matter that may give rise to a
conflict of interest or other ethical bar to representation. As noted above
the document indicates that the contract is not for the performance of
personal services. As long as the relationship in a particular case is so
viewed, the federal conflict of interest statutes may not apply. 42 4
OGC legal staff must approve all major strategic and tactical deci-
sions and work closely with outside counsel to develop case plans and
budgets and otherwise monitor the work of outside counsel by, for exam-
ple, reviewing drafts of pleadings, briefs and other documents. Outside
counsel must discuss proposed staffing with the assigned OGC attorney
before any case assignments are made.
Currently the FSLIC is in the process of developing a Litigation
Manual to further standardize its oversight of outside counsel and to
train new OGC attorneys. In the interim the OGC has adopted a set of
preliminary guidelines which describe the reporting requirements im-
posed on legal services contractors along with the methods for monitor-
ing their performance. There is supposed to be an annual evaluation of
each private attorney's cooperation with the agency, work quality, rap-
port, success, and responsiveness to OGC direction, among other things.
423 See supra note 419 and preceding text.
424 See infra note 442 and accompanying text. But see infra note 445 and accompanying text.
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Payment for services is based on hourly rates, the range of which is
specified in the legal services agreement with the FSLIC. The negotiated
rate can be changed only by written amendment to the contract and firms
may not propose or charge rates in excess of those it is charging the
FSLIC on other matters. Reimbursement for certain expenses, at cost, is
provided. The negotiations for the contract will involve discussions re-
garding such matters as the extent to which the FSLIC will pay for certain
expenses. The FSLIC is always able to obtain discounts in fees from pri-
vate attorneys because of the volume of the work assigned.425
Invoices are required to be submitted monthly. The content of
these is prescribed to include the names of agency personnel who re-
viewed 'the work in question, a description and cost of the services, in-
cluding the name(s) of the individuial(s) performing them and the time
expended. Also on a monthly basis the contractor must file a report de-
tailing the total billings for the month for both fees and expenses, cumu-
lative total billings for all months, names of subcontractors used, and,
with regard to litigated matters, the estimated recoverable damages. An
agency attorney is designated as the General Counsel's Official Repre-
sentative whose duties include placing orders for services and inspecting
a contractor's work for compliance with the statement of work and stan-
dard of performance prior to payment for services rendered.
The FSLIC has spent a considerable time developing a computer-
ized Legal Information Management System ("LIMS"), the first phase of
which became operative during the spring of 1988 with regard to FSLIC
corporate matters. Similar.to the FDIC Case Management System, the
LIMS is designed to provide up-to-date standardized information about
all legal cases or matters being handled by outside counsel, including
estimated and incurred fees, issues raised, settlements, judgment and
success ratios. The system will eventually be extended to matters related
to FSLIC as a receiver of failed thrifts.
C. Other Federal Departments and Agencies
With regard to other federal departments and agencies, the available
data relating to their use of outside counsel is' several years old in many
instances and incomplete with regard to some of the issues canvassed by
this report. Nevertheless, there appears to be a sufficient basis on which
to draw several general conclusions.
First of all, legal work of all types, from'the purely advisory to litiga-
tion, is contracted out. Some agencies use litigation counsel frequently;
others rarely or not at all. The reasons for procuring the services of pri-
vate counsel appear to be similar to those relied upon by the FDIC, the
FSLIC and private corporations. 426 Written agency guidelines with re-
gard to retention of outside counsel and other matters do exist in some
cases, and vary from sketchy to relatively elaborate. Competitive proce-
dures are utilized on occasion; at other times some of the exceptions
under CICA to full and open competition are relied upon. The relation-
425 FHLBB Interview, supra note 396.
426 See supra note 29 and accompanying text, and supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
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ship generally established with the service provider appears to be consid-
ered purely contractual, not employer-employee. Fees paid and fee
arrangements vary significantly, to some degree apparently reflective of
the type of work involved. Control over retention appears to usually rest
in the agency's General Counsel Office. Finally, while contracting out
may be the exception rather than the rule in the case of most agencies, a
substantial amount of public funds appears to be spent each year for at-
torneys' services when the expenditures by all agencies are combined.
A tabular summary of the available data is presented in Appendix A
to this article.
V. Conflicts of Interest
A person performing services for the government may be subject to
a variety of statutory prohibitions on receipt of salary427 and compensa-
tion428 from private sources, participating in governmental decisions in
which he or his associates has a financial interest,429 acting as attorney or
agent in certain proceedings at the same time he is working for the gov-
ernment, 430 and serving as an agent or attorney with respect to certain
matters following his departure from government employ-
ment.43 'Violations are subject to criminal penalties.
These restrictions apply to "officers" and "employees" of the
United States, including so-called "special Government employees."
They are not limited to attorneys but apply to all persons falling within
the ambit of these terms. Attorneys are subject to other conflict of inter-
est regulation pursuant to state codes of professional responsibility, 432
which codes may be more demanding in various respects than the federal
criminal law or perhaps less stringent in others. In the latter case, of
course compliance with federal law is not excused.
Special government employees are subject to somewhat less restric-
tions than "regular" employees with regard to the prohibitions on re-
ceipt of salary433  and "compensation" for their services, 434
representation activities while in government service, 435 and activities
following their federal employment.43 6 With respect to the prohibitions
relating to acts affecting a personal financial interest, no distinction is
427 See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1982).
428 Id. at § 203.
429 Id. at § 208.
430 Id. at § 205.
431 Id. at § 207. Section 2 07 (g) imposes certain prohibitions on partners of special government
employees.
432 See generally Rotunda, supra note 57.
433 18 U.S.C. § 209(c) (1982).
434 Id. at § 203(c).
435 Id. at § 205.
436 Id. at § 207(c).
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made between special government employees437  and other
employees. 4
38
In the context of agency retention of outside counsel, it may be cru-
cial to determine whether the attorney chosen is an "employee" within
the meaning of these statutes. If he is, performance of "duties" pursuant
to contract for more than the designated 130 days a year will mean that
he is subject to the more comprehensive conflict of interest restrictions;
if for 130 days or less, then the less restrictive, though still substantial,
conditions attach. If he is not an "officer" or "employee," then the re-
strictions do not apply of their own force, though an agency might
choose to incorporate them in any contract awarded.
Attorneys appointed as temporary experts or consultants pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 3109439 clearly fall within these conflict of interest provi-
sions.440 Similarly outside counsel appointed, for example, as litigators for
the Federal Election Commission pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9010441 may
be covered.. If, however, a service provider is deemed to be an "in-
dependent" contractor, the statutes do not apply.4 42 As a general mat-
ter, the greater the supervision and control exercised over the
contractor's work, the more likely the contractor may be deemed an "em-
ployee" for the purposes of title 18.443 While some interpretations of
these federal conflict-of-interest statutes have referred to the civil service
definition of "employee," 444 which emphasizes the element of "supervi-
sion,'445 this has not always been accepted as the only appropriate ap-
proach. One court has indicated that a temporary consultant appointed
under section 3109 and a special government employee within the mean-
ing of 18 U.S.C. § 202(a) need not meet the civil service definition of
"employee" and the alleged "strict supervision" test incorporated
therein. 446 It, therefore, appears that a respectable argument might be
made that attorneys retained under the 1986 Debt Collection Amend-
ments may be considered "employees" within the purview of the conflict
of interest provisions given the degree of control over their activities
437 A "special Government employee" means:
an officer or employee of the executive or legislative branch of the United States Govern-
ment, of any independent agency of the United States or of the District of Columbia who is
retained, designated, appointed, or employed to perform, with or without compensation,
for not to exceed one hundred and thirty days during any period of three hundred and
sixty-five consecutive days, temporary duties either on a full-time or intermittent basis.
Id. at § 202(a).
438 Id. at § 208(a).
439 See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
440 See generally Federal Personnel Manual, Chapter 735 Appendix C.
441 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
442 See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, Memorandum Opinion for the Dep-
uty Associate Attorney General (prepared by Larry A. Hammond, Mar. 23, 1979).
443 Id n.2.
444 Id. See also Memorandum from J. Jackson Walter, Director, Office of Personnel Management
to Heads of Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch Re Members of Federal Advisory
Committees and the Conflict-of-Interest Statutes (July 9, 1982) at 6 [hereinafter Walter
Memorandum].
445 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(3) (1982).
446 See Aluminum Co. of America v. F.T.C., 589 F. Supp. 169, 175-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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which is apparently contemplated by the legislation, regulations, and
contract documents.
4 47
An agency seeking to retain outside counsel may believe that the re-
strictions applicable under the conflict of interest provisions of title 18
will unduly restrict its ability to obtain the type of attorney or firm it be-
lieves it needs to adequately perform the services. Where this is the case,
surrender of substantial control, where permitted by law, may be the only
way to avoid this result, though it may in fact not always be sufficient in
and of itself.4 48 On the other hand, where an agency believes that any
attorney retained should adhere to the statutory restrictions, it has more
freedom in structuring its relationship with the contractor and, even
where the contractor is deemed "independent", the agency could impose
the prohibitions of title 18 by contract.
Where these restrictions do apply, the agency should examine for
potential conflicts at the stage where it is considering which firm or attor-
ney to retain and also require disclosure by the contractor of actual or
potential conflicts as soon as they become evident after contract execu-
tion. 4 4 9 At the outset of the relationship the contractor should be clearly
advised that the prohibitions of title 18 apply4 50 (if they do).
VI. General Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
Clearly, retaining outside counsel to provide legal services to the
federal government is the exception rather than the rule for most agen-
cies. Other than those instances where there might be a lack of legal
authority, this pattern may be attributable to a variety of factors, includ-
ing historical practice and a concern for the morale of government attor-
neys who might view such service contracting as suggesting a less than
confident agency evaluation of their legal abilities. More importantly,
the relative infrequency of seeking outside legal assistance may implicitly
reflect judgments that it is indeed more cost effective to rely on in-house
expertise than outside counsel in most cases, that consideration of the
government and public interest is more likely to be uppermost in the
minds of full-time employees than outsiders, and that control over the
rendition of the services by a contractor in order to avoid potential con-
stitutional and other problems is more realistically achievable where a
full-fledged employer-employee relationship exists. Opinions of the
General Accounting Office suggest that, before an agency seeks outside
legal assistance, it should assure itself that its staff is not in a position to
provide the advice or other services needed.45 1 In some instances the
447 See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. See also Lovitky, supra note 48, at 345-48.
448 See Walter Memorandum, supra note 444.
449 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 37.205(b)(4) (1987) (in consulting contracts, disclosure to be required
and warning given regarding conflicts).
450 Cf FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, ch. 375, app. C at 2. Other than the provisions of title 18
dealing with conflicts of interest, the Code of Federal Regulations contains numerous provisions
dealing with employee responsibilities and conduct. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 735 (1986). Moreover the
FAR itself has provisions dealing with organizational conflicts, see 48 C.F.R. § 9.508 (1986), which
are applicable to service contracting. Id. at § 37.110(d).
451 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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staff of other agencies may be in a position to help out and this option
may profitably be explored.
Departures from historical practice, even if clearly justified, may
have unsettling effects on citizens' perceptions of their government and
argue for some degree of caution, or at least clear explanation for these
changes. In taking various procurement actions, failure to consider their
impact on employee morale may result in the loss of competent and dedi-
cated professionals to the private sector. However, where it is more cost
effective to retain outside counsel than perform the services by full-time
employees, where sufficient control can be exercised over the legal con-
tractor to protect the government's and public's interests, and where ad-
equate mechanisms are in place to protect against conflicts of interest,
legal service contracting can be justified and should at least not be dis-
couraged as long as the contracting agency fully considers those less eas-
ily quantifiable effects of its procurement activities. Moreover in
calculating the economic costs of obtaining outside assistance, the
agency must consider those costs imposed by the procurement process
itself (including delay) and the needs for supervision over any attorney(s)
retained.
In the private sector, corporations have increasingly scrutinized their
practices of going outside for legal assistance to determine whether or
not they are economically justified. The upshot of this reevaluation has
resulted in many cases in expansion of in-house staffs. For most federal
agencies, the question may in fact present the "flip side" of the problem
facing the private firm: whether they should increase the number of in-
stances where they seek the legal services of private attorneys.
In determining cost-effectiveness it is clear that the situation con-
fronting each agency must be individually considered; generalizations
may be of little help. 4 52 One thing is clear though-price should not be
considered in the abstract. The per hour salary cost for in-house assist-
ance may be $40 and that of outside counsel may be $140, but if the
likelihood of a successful result is ten times greater in the case where a
private attorney is utilized because of his or her experience with the
problem, reliance on, the governmental employee for the work may be
difficult to justify. In view of this, mandatory imposition by legislation of
"fee caps" 453 on the amounts paid private attorneys is simply not a good
idea since it may prevent the government from obtaining the quality of
legal service that it needs to adequately carry out its functions.
.For agencies which only occasionally require legal services of a par-
ticular kind, it may make little economic sense to argue that the perma-
nent staff size should be augmented for the sole purpose of dealing with
these cases. Choosing the optimal full-time staff size is, however, hardly
an exact science. For example, putting aside the difficulties in obtaining
congressional approval of funds for staff augmentation, the advisability
of significant additions to in-house legal staff in the case of the FDIC and
452 See generally Fischer, supra note 1.
453 See, e.g., S. 1580, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. ($75 per hour limit on private counsel for litigation).
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the FSLIC is made problematical by uncertainty regarding how long the
current rash of bank failures will continue.
In determining the optimal size for an in-house legal staff, an agency
may profit from the techniques of analysis being developed in the private
sector.454 However, in making that calculation, consideration must be
given to resource needs related to supervision exercised over outside
counsel by full-time staff. In that regard, moreover, as the nature of re-
quired legal services changes-from purely advisory, to actively dealing
with third parties on behalf of the government as in a labor negotiation,
to the conduct of litigation-the need for close control over outside
counsel may substantially increase based on both constitutional and
other considerations. Unlike the situation facing a private corporation,
this increased need for and exercise of control can result in the imposi-
tion of a variety of legal restrictions relating to the retention of outside
counsel. 455 This in turn may prevent successfully contracting out where,
in purely economic terms, it is fully justified. Or it may make it more
expensive to contract for needed services. For example, due to man-
dated pay limits or conflict of interest restrictions, private lawyers may be
unwilling to furnish requested services or may be willing to do so only at
a cost which is prohibitive for the government. This is not to suggest,
however, that "control" need be seen as purchased at too high a price in
these instances.
Where control of varying degrees is authorized, the techniques cur-
rently found in the private sector456 and in the practices of the FDIC and
FSLIC457 may be worthy of emulation, with appropriate modifications, by
other federal instrumentalities. It should be noted that these procedures
attempt to insure that costs are minimized throughout the performance
of the contract.
It is questionable whether a particular federal agency should now be
authorized or required to draft mandatory criteria and practices applica-
ble to contracting for legal services by other agencies. First of all, experi-
mentation in the area of improving cost-effectiveness in the provision of
legal services is of relatively recent origin in the private sector. It may,
therefore, be premature to draft any set of trans-agency regulations. Sec-
ondly, the situations facing various agencies may be unique in ways that
argue against trans-agency practices in this area. When it comes to litiga-
tion by outside counsel, the experience of the banking agencies is more
impressive than many other agencies, including the Department of Jus-
tice. Yet much of their expertise may be conditioned by the peculiarities
of the problems facing them.
Accordingly, each agency, including the Department of Justice,
should experiment with its practices in retaining outside counsel, keep-
ing in mind both cost-effectiveness and the needs for control of decision-
making. No one agency should be vested with the power of overview and
454 See generally Fischer, supra note 1.
455 See, e.g., supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
456 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
457 See supra notes 356-79, 423-25 and accompanying text.
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regulation of these practices at the present time. An exception to this
could be made in those instances where the Department of Justice is
granted by statute the authority to permit (and restrict) an agency's use
of outside counsel for litigation 458 or where the only basis for the
agency's litigation authority is a memorandum of understanding with
Justice. Here an argument exists that Justice should at least have the
power to review and veto an agency's choice of criteria and procedures
for contracting for litigation services.
At the same time all agencies should be encouraged to communicate
among themselves and with the private sector with regard to techniques
for insuring that the use of outside counsel is cost-effective. It may be
also advisable in many cases to require that the agency's Office of Gen-
eral Counsel approve all legal services contracts to insure overall super-
vision and control of the extent of legal service contracting.459 In
addition, written documentation should be prepared by each agency that
may need to retain private attorneys, considering such matters as the cri-
teria for deciding when to retain outside counsel, which attorneys to re-
tain, and guidance to firms or attorneys chosen regarding agency
practices and expectations. Written documents are useful for training
purposes and to jog memory as well as avoid misunderstandings with
outside counsel. In drafting these, appropriate attention should be given
to similar documents prepared by other agencies and private
corporations.
In terms of the procedures for choosing which attorney or firm
should provide a particular service, Congress has been reasonably ex-
plicit on this matter with the enactment in 1984 of the Competition in
Contracting Act.460 That statute provides- exemptions from its formal
competitive requirements in particular cases, such as where there is a
need for immediate action, so that agencies may not be unduly hampered
in many instances, though one study has suggested that the procedures
mandated by the Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation may signifi-
cantly slow procurement. 46 1 Even where the costs, in terms of delay or
otherwise, of allowing full and open competition are significant and the
economic savings from competition are small, the noneconomic benefits
of competition in dispelling to some degree the fact or appearance of
favoritism may still be substantial.
It is clear, moreover, that savings to the government resulting from
competition, whether formally or informally conducted, can be signifi-
cant and that cost-saving competitive procedures can be structured to
apply to legal services even though the lowest price may not be the sole
consideration. 462 Accordingly, even where the CICA is not by its terms
458 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1830(a) (1982); supra note 69.
459 See ACUS Hearing, supra note 318, at 27-28 (statement of Joseph Welsh, former Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Transportation).
460 See supra notes 131-84 and accompanying text.
461 See Ruttinger, supra note 157, at 20, 24, 35 (whether or not an exemption applies). See also
ACUS Recommendation 86-8, Acquiring the Services of "Neutrals" for Alternative Means of Dis-
pute Resolution, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-8 (1987) (changes in FAR may be required).
462 See supra notes 124 and 349-53 and accompanying text.
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applicable, agencies should be encouraged to develop and experiment
with competitive procedures to the extent appropriate where legal serv-
ices contracting is involved.
Finally, while legal services contracting should not be discouraged,
the role of the attorney in government463 is such that the amount of such
procurement should be publicly documented. Accordingly, where feasi-
ble, each agency should prepare an annual public report or otherwise
maintain a publicly available list indicating for each legal services con-
tract the name of the attorney retained, the type of work involved, the
reason for seeking outside assistance, what, if any, competitive proce-
dures were used, and the fee paid.
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FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A
1. "N/D" indicates that there is no available information with regard to the matter to which it
applies. Unless otherwise indicated in these footnotes, the data used to compile Appendix A
was furnished in response to requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1982), by the National Law Journal several years ago. See Nat'l L.J. Feb. 4, 1985, at
51. The National Law Journal (NLJ) compiled the following list of agencies along with their
legal services expenditures in 1983-84:
How Much Government Agencies Spent
Federal Agency
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board/Federal Savings





Department of Treasury (Including Comptroller)
Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S. Postal Service
Department ofJustice, Civil Division
Federal Emergency Management Agency




Department of International Development
U.S. Air Force

























*Through first nine months of 1984.
**1983 only.
***Preliminary estimate.
Agencies surveyed that reported no use of outside counsel included:
Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, Department of Labor, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission, National Science Foundation, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Federal Election Commission, General Services Ad-
ministration, Tax and Antitrust Divisions of the Deparment of Justice,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Labor Relations
Authority, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Bureau
of Government Financial Operations.
A close examination of Appendix A indicates some relatively minor differences between
NLJ figures and those derived from this consultant's review of the FOIA and other material.
The reasons for these discrepancies are unclear at this time.
Finally, it should be noted in connection with Appendix A, that data contained under one
heading may not always relate to that under another for the same agency, thus introducing
certain possible misperceptions. Unfortunately, the lack of complete data at this time prevent-
ed a perfect matching.
2. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, Draft Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States (hereinafter "Wolf, Block Report") at 68.
3. Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 70.
5. Id. at 70-71.
6. Administrative Conference [ACUS] Questionnaire Response from Francis S. Blake, General
Counsel, EPA to Marshall Breger, Chairman, ACUS (Mar. 6, 1987).
7. "CICA" refers to the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, now codified in 41 U.S.C.,
§§ 251 et seq.
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8. Wolf, Block Report supra note 2, at,80.
9. There are internal guidance documents applicable to the retaining of outside counsel by
Federal Reserve Banks.
10. Wolf, Block Report, supra note 2, at 83-84.
11. Id. at 71-72; ACUS Questionnaire Response from Darrel J. Grinstead, Associate General
Counsel, HHS, to Marshall Breger, Chairman, ACUS (Mar. 30, 1987).
12. ACUS Questionnaire Responses from Stuart C. Sloame, Deputy General Counsel, HUD to
Marshall Breger, Chairman, ACUS (Feb. 20, 1987 and May 19, 1987) and Wolf, Block
Report, supra note 2 at 72-73. The Department has internal guidance documents regarding
fee schedules.
13. ACUS Questionnaire Response from Howard H. Shafferman, Associate Solicitor, Division of
General Law, Department of the Interior, to Marshall J. Breger, Chairman, ACUS (no date).
14. Wolf, Block Report, supra note 2, at 73-75. The Department of Justice has both regulations
and written internal guidance documents dealing with the hiring of private counsel. See 28
C.F.R. § 50.15, 50.16 (1987) and Administrative Directive 2120 (Sept. 20, 1982) (Civil
Division).
15. See General Accounting Office, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES FOR PRIVATE COUNSEL AND JUDICIAL
FEE AWARDS IN ANTITRUST AND SECURITIES CASES (GAO/GGD-84-2, Oct. 7, 1983).
16. Wolf, Block Report, supra note 2, at 75.
17. Id. at 84.
18. Id. at 76.
19. Id. at 84-85.
20. Public Hearing Record, Federal Agency Hiring of Private Attorneys, convened by
Administrative Conference of the United States, May 29, 1986, Washington, D.C.
(Testimony of Frank McCulloch, Special Counsel, PBGC).
21. Letter of Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel to Marshall Breger, Chairman, ACUS (May 13,
1987).
22. Wolf, Block Report, supra note 2, at 86-87.
23. Id. at 76-77.
24. In several cases DOT has also hired outside counsel to pursue administrative level
procurement. See id. at 78-79. The Department has written internal guidance relating to the
hiring of experts and consultants. See DOT Order 4200.15 (March 5, 1981).
25. ACUS Questionnaire Response from Neil R. Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for
Regulation and Enforcement, DOT, to David Pritzker, ACUS (no date).
26. Id.
27. ACUS Questionnaire Response from Neil R. Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for
Regulation and Enforcement, DOT, to David Pritzker, ACUS (Apr. 6, 1987). See also
General Accounting Office, CONRAIL SALE: DOT's SELECTION OF INVESTMENT BANKS TO
UNDERWRrrE THE SALE OF CONRAIL (GAO/RCED 87-88). (In this instance a law firm was
involved in the selection of investment banks to serve as co-lead managers for the sale of
Conrail.)
28. ACUS Questionnaire Responses from Neil R. Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for
Regulation and Enforcement, DOT, to David Pritzker, ACUS (one not dated; the other
dated April 2, 1987).
29. Appendix A-l was compiled from information furnished in response to the National Law
Journal FOIA request.
30. Wolf, Block Report, supra note 2, at 79.
31. Id. at 87-88.
32. See General Accounting Office, POSTAL SERVICE: BOARD OF GOVERNOR'S CONTRACT FOR
LEGAL SERVICES (GAO/GGD-87-12).
33. ACUS Questionnaire Response tinder cover letter from Frederic L; Conway, Special
Assistant to the General Counsel, VA, to David Pritzker, ACUS (Feb. 12, 1987). The VA has
both regulations and written internal guidance dealing with'hiring outside attorneys. See,
e.q., 38 C.F.R. § 14.515(b) (1987).
34. Appendix A-2 was compiled from information furnished in response to the National Law
Journal FOIA request.
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Regional Office (RO) hired attorney for research on the impact of
aboriginal land claims under Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). It
was estimated that this project would cost $5,600.00
B. California
RO signed contracts amounting to, respectively, $19,998.40, $21,000,
$17,000 and $20,000 to provide trial counsel for fired air traffic controllers.
C. District of Columbia
RO signed three contracts for outside legal counsel during fiscal years 1983
and 1984. The first contract was for trial work for the government's case against
COMSAT before DOT's contracts appeal board. The pay schedule for the
contract was:
partners $150/hour
associate > 4 years $125/hour
associate < 4 years $115/hour
paralegal $ 35/hour
The estimated cost of the project was $125,000.
The second contract was for litigation against General Dynamics. The
estimated cost of the litigation was $195,000 and the pay schedule was:
senior partner $140/hour
senior associate $ 95/hour
junior associate $ 75/hour
paralegal $ 30/hour
The third contract was for work dealing with a labor agreement between the





RO signed contract to try ex-air traffic controller removal cases. The
estimated cost of the legal work was $9,000.
E. Oklahoma
RO signed two contracts during fiscal years 1983 and 1984 for defending a
case filed by Mike Mahonroney Aeronautical Center. One contract was for an






1. Alabama: uses outside counsel for evictions and foreclosures; in 1983
$13,454.00, in 1984 $23,358.24.
2. Arizona: for evictions and foreclosures in outlying counties surrounding
Pho nixi7taff attorneys do evictions locally; in 1983 and 1984, paid a total of
$20,750.00 for foreclosures; during the same period, $430.00 on evictions.
3. California: for eviction proceedings, during 1983 and 1984, contracted out
18 evictions at a fee of $75.00 each, for a total expenditure of $1,350.00.
4. Colorado: spent $2,094.08 for outside counsel to represent the agency in
eviction hearings in 1983 and the first half of 1984 and spent $2,050.13 for the
same from 1/84 through 7/84.
5. Connecticut: employed one.law firm during fiscal years '83 and '84; firm
was retained to do a title search for a fee of $100.00.
6. Washington, D.C.: contracted with four firms during fiscal years '83 and
'84 or eviction and foreclosure proceedings in Maryland, Virginia and the
District of Columbia; the following is a break-down of the fees paid to outside
counsel-
Evictions Foreclosures Total
1983 7,957.58 2,210.00 10,167.58
1984 3,420.60 3,960.00 7,380.60
7. Georgia: retained outside -counsel for many actions related to its loan
guaranty program and spent $24,738.82 between 1/4/83 and 9/20/84.
8. Idaho: spent $480.00 during 1983 for outside counsel for trustee and
foreclosure sales.
9. Illinois: hired outside counsel for forcible detainers; in 1983, the fees
totaled $4,268.24; in 1984, the fees totalled $84,384.47.
10. Iowa: in 1983 and 1984, spent $1,313.21 to retain outside counsel to
work on eviction proceedings.
11. Indiana: during fiscal year 1983, spent $6,375.00 to retain outside
counselfor51 eviction proceedings; during fiscal year 1984, spent $4,364.06 to
retain outside counsel for 25 eviction proceedings; during both '83 and '84,
spent $175.00 for outside counsel for three loan closings. The total spent on
outside counsel during '83 and '84 was $10,914.06.
12. Louisiana: in 1983 and 1984, spent $44,937.00 in retaining outside
counsel for sale closings, recording deeds, foreclosure filings, evictions and
sheriff sales and used 49 different law firms.
13. Maine: in 1983 and 1984, spent $9,920.63 in retaining outside counsel
for tiTe updates, eviction and foreclosure proceedings and title searches.
14. Maryland: in fiscal year 1983, employed three firms for eviction
proceedings and title searches and spent $1,955.00; in 1984; employed 10 firms
for title searches, foreclosures and evictions and spent $3,070.00; the total spent
on outside counsel was $5,025.00.
15. Massachusetts: during fiscal years 1983 and 1984, employed nine firms in
sixty-six actions and spent $3,705.00.
16. Michigan: during fiscal years '83 and '84, employed twenty-eight firms for
eviction and foreclosure proceedings and sale closings and spent $80,269.00.
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17. Minnesota: during fiscal years '83 and '84, employed outside counsel for
loan closings and foreclosures and spent $25,965.00.
18. Missouri: spent approximately $600.00 on outside counsel during fiscal
years T3 and '84.
19. Montana: employed fourteen firms for trustee sales, evictions, removing
direct loans from bankruptcy and accountings for guardianship actions and
spent $3,343.69.
20. New Hampshire: employed nine law firms to perform foreclosure and
eviction proceedings and spent $10,833.48.
21. New.Jersey: employed thirteen law firms for sale closings and eviction
proceedings and spent $32,415.00.
22. New York:
a. Buffalo: only used outside counsel for eviction proceedings at the
request of the Loan Guaranty Division; in 1983, four
firms were used in nine eviction proceedings for
$1,676.33; in 1984, four firms were used in seven
eviction proceedings for $500.90.
b. New York: use of outside counsel was limited solely to operation of
the loan guaranty program; outside counsel handled 418
evictions and 520 foreclosure sales for fees totalling
$221,433.69.
23. North Carolina: employed fourteen firms to handle 83 foreclosure
proceedings at the cost of $20,750.00.
24. Ohio: spent $68,444.97 on outside legal counsel during 1983 and
1984; counsel retained for handling sheriff sales.
25. Oregon: spent $2,150 in 1984 for eviction proceedings handled by
outside counsel and $681.15 in 1984 for foreclosures handled by outside
counsel.
26. Pennsylvania: outside counsel retained only for eviction proceed-
ings; during 1983 and 1984, employed 15 attorneys and spent
$47,592.00.
27. Tennessee: employed outside counsel for 169 eviction cases and 2
guardianship cases and spent $17,485.72.
28. Texas:
a. Waco: employed five attorneys for forcible entry and de-
tainer actions.
b. Houston: spent $19,936.90 on outside legal counsel during
1983 and 1984.
29. Utah: spent $100.00 on outside counsel for two trustee sales.
30. Vermont: retained ten firms for title searches and sale closings and
spent $1,957.90.
31. Virginia: retained eighteen firms for foreclosure and eviction pro-
ceedings and spent $8,830.00.
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32. Washington: began using outside counsel in 1984 and spent
$3,802.41.
33. West Virginia: employed outside counsel for two eviction proceed-
ings and spent $416.05.
34. Wisconsin: two fee attorneys employed by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration in connection with the closing of direct loans with specially adapt-
ed housing grants in Wisconsin and spent $390.00.
The total spent by all of the reporting officers was $909,765.25.
